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The valuation process that economic agents undergo for investments with uncertain payoff typically depends on their statistical views on possible future outcomes, their attitudes toward risk, and, of course, the payoff structure itself.…
Political realism aims to describe the interaction of agents involved in struggles for political power. This article formulates realism in terms of quantitative postulates that depict political power as a fluid-like substance flowing…
We consider two sided matching markets consisting of agents with non-transferable utilities; agents from the opposite sides form matching pairs (e.g., buyers-sellers) and negotiate the terms of their math which may include a monetary…
A generalized family of Adversary Robust Consensus protocols is proposed and analyzed. These are distributed algorithms for multi-agents systems seeking to agree on a common value of a shared variable, even in the presence of faulty or…
The sharing of scarce resources among multiple rational agents is one of the classical problems in economics. In exchange economies, which are used to model such situations, agents begin with an initial endowment of resources and exchange…
We analyse two models of liquidity provision to determine the retail traders' preference for marketable order routing. Order internalization is captured by a model of market makers competing for the retail order flow in a Bertrand fashion.…
We study the power of (competitive) algorithms with predictions in a multiagent setting. We introduce a two predictor framework, that assumes that agents use one predictor for their future (self) behavior, and one for the behavior of the…
We consider a sharing economy network where agents embedded in a graph share their resources. This is a fundamental model that abstracts numerous emerging applications of collaborative consumption systems. The agents generate a random…
We study risk-sharing economies where heterogenous agents trade subject to quadratic transaction costs. The corresponding equilibrium asset prices and trading strategies are characterised by a system of nonlinear, fully-coupled…
Exchange of services and resources in, or over, networks is attracting nowadays renewed interest. However, despite the broad applicability and the extensive study of such models, e.g., in the context of P2P networks, many fundamental…
We study a repeated trading problem in which a mechanism designer facilitates trade between a single seller and multiple buyers. Our model generalizes the classic bilateral trade setting to a multi-buyer environment. Specifically, the…
Many-to-many matching with contracts is studied in the framework of revealed preferences. All preferences are described by choice functions that satisfy natural conditions. Under a no-externality assumption individual preferences can be…
We use a principal-agent model to analyze the structure of a book-driven dealer market when the dealer faces competition from a crossing network or dark pool. The agents are privately informed about their types (e.g. their portfolios),…
Bipartite matching, where agents on one side of a market are matched to agents or items on the other, is a classical problem in computer science and economics, with widespread application in healthcare, education, advertising, and general…
We consider mechanisms for markets that are double-sided and have players with multi-dimensional strategic spaces on at least one side. The players of the market are strategic, and act to optimize their own utilities. The mechanism…
Bilateral bargaining under incomplete information provides a controlled testbed for evaluating large language model (LLM) agent capabilities. Bilateral trade demands individual rationality, strategic surplus maximization, and cooperation to…
In a multi-party machine learning system, different parties cooperate on optimizing towards better models by sharing data in a privacy-preserving way. A major challenge in learning is the incentive issue. For example, if there is…
We study the fundamental problem of designing contracts in principal-agent problems under uncertainty. Previous works mostly addressed Bayesian settings in which principal's uncertainty is modeled as a probability distribution over agent's…
Trades based on bilateral (indivisible) contracts can be represented by a network. Vertices correspond to agents while arcs represent the non-price elements of a bilateral contract. Given prices for each arc, agents choose the incident arcs…
We introduce pricing formulas for competition and collusion models of two-sided markets with an outside option. For the competition model, we find conditions under which prices and consumer surplus may increase or decrease if the outside…