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Bargaining, a critical aspect of real-world interactions, presents challenges for large language models (LLMs) due to limitations in strategic depth and adaptation to complex human factors. Existing benchmarks often fail to capture this…
The paper develops a decentralized resource allocation mechanism for allocating divisible goods with capacity constraints to non-price-taking agents with general concave utilities. The proposed mechanism is always budget balanced,…
We study online task assignment problem with reusable resources, motivated by practical applications such as ridesharing, crowdsourcing and job hiring. In the problem, we are given a set of offline vertices (agents), and, at each time, an…
In network formation games, agents form edges with each other to maximize their utility. Each agent's utility depends on its private beliefs and its edges in the network. Strategic agents can misrepresent their beliefs to get a better…
This paper considers a key agreement problem in which two parties aim to agree on a key by exchanging messages in the presence of adversarial tampering. The aim of the adversary is to disrupt the key agreement process, but there are no…
We derive the arbitrage gains or, equivalently, Loss Versus Rebalancing (LVR) for arbitrage between \textit{two imperfectly liquid} markets, extending prior work that assumes the existence of an infinitely liquid reference market. Our…
A public decision-making problem consists of a set of issues, each with multiple possible alternatives, and a set of competing agents, each with a preferred alternative for each issue. We study adaptations of market economies to this…
Coordination in distributed environments, like Grids, involves selecting the most appropriate services, resources or compositions to carry out the planned activities. Such functionalities appear at various levels of the infrastructure and…
Either saying that the market is structured to promote workforce exploitation in some sections or the people who participate there benefit from the existing structure and exploit, exploitation happens - systematically or opportunistically.…
We study a generic principal-agent problem in continuous time on a finite time horizon. We introduce a framework in which the agent is allowed to employ measure-valued controls and characterise the continuation utility as a solution to a…
We model real-world data markets, where sellers post fixed prices and buyers are free to purchase from any set of sellers, as a simultaneous game. A key component here is the negative externality buyers induce on one another due to data…
The problem of efficient sharing of a resource is nearly ubiquitous. Except for pure public goods, each agent's use creates a negative externality; often the negative externality is so strong that efficient sharing is impossible in the…
We solve the two-player bargaining problem employing Weber's law in psychophysics, which is applied to the perception of utility changes. Using this law, the players define the jointly acceptable range of utilities on the Pareto line, which…
Humans judge each other's actions, which at least partly functions to detect and deter cheating and to enable helpfulness in an indirect reciprocity fashion. However, most forms of judging do not only concern the action itself, but also the…
Although both data availability and the demand for accurate forecasts are increasing, collaboration between stakeholders is often constrained by data ownership and competitive interests. In contrast to recent proposals within cooperative…
This paper develops a model in which a sender strategically communicates with a group of receivers whose payoffs depend on the sender's information. It is shown that aggregate payoff externalities create an endogenous conflict of interests…
A principal hires an agent to acquire soft information about an unknown state. Even though neither how the agent learns nor what the agent discovers are contractible, we show the principal is unconstrained as to what information the agent…
We take an axiomatic approach to the allocation of riparian water rights. We formalize ethical or structural properties as axioms of allocation rules. We show that several combinations of these axioms characterize focal rules implementing…
This paper revisits the classic instrument choice problem in a setting with consumption externalities, through the lens of robust mechanism design. A regulator can implement any incentive-compatible policy but is uncertain about how…
Social issues are generally discussed by highly-involved and less-involved people to build social norms defining what has to be thought and done about them. As self-involved agents share different attitude dynamics to other agents Wood,…