Related papers: Approximate Strategyproofness in Large, Two-Sided …
We establish that all strategy-proof social choice rules in strict preference domains follow necessarily a two-step procedure. In the first step, agents are asked to reveal some specific information about their preferences. Afterwards, a…
We study the problem of locating a single facility on a real line based on the reports of self-interested agents, when agents have double-peaked preferences, with the peaks being on opposite sides of their locations. We observe that…
Sequential fundraising in two sided online platforms enable peer to peer lending by sequentially bringing potential contributors, each of whose decisions impact other contributors in the market. However, understanding the dynamics of…
This paper considers the hidden-action model of the principal-agent problem, in which a principal incentivizes an agent to work on a project using a contract. We investigate whether contracts with bounded payments are learnable and…
This paper explores the utility of agent-based simulations in realistically modelling market structures and sheds light on the nuances of optimal dealer strategies. It underscores the contrast between conclusions drawn from probabilistic…
We develop inference for a two-sided matching model where the characteristics of agents on one side of the market are endogenous due to pre-matching investments. The model can be used to measure the impact of frictions in labour markets…
We study stable matchings that are robust to preference changes in the two-sided stable matching setting of Gale and Shapley [GS62]. Given two instances $A$ and $B$ on the same set of agents, a matching is said to be robust if it is stable…
We initiate the study of distortion in stable matching. Concretely, we aim to design algorithms that have limited access to the agents' cardinal preferences and compute stable matchings of high quality with respect to some aggregate…
Stable matching, a classical model for two-sided markets, has long been studied with little consideration for how each side's preferences are learned. With the advent of massive online markets powered by data-driven matching platforms, it…
The primary contribution of this paper resides in devising constant-factor approximation guarantees for revenue maximization in two-sided matching markets, under general pairwise rewards. A major distinction between our work and…
We consider two sided matching markets consisting of agents with non-transferable utilities; agents from the opposite sides form matching pairs (e.g., buyers-sellers) and negotiate the terms of their math which may include a monetary…
We initiate the work on maximin share (MMS) fair allocation of m indivisible chores to n agents using only their ordinal preferences, from both algorithmic and mechanism design perspectives. The previous best-known approximation is 2-1/n by…
Suppose that we have $n$ agents and $n$ items which lie in a shared metric space. We would like to match the agents to items such that the total distance from agents to their matched items is as small as possible. However, instead of having…
Strategy-proofness is a fundamental desideratum in mechanism design, ensuring truthful reporting and robust participation. Stability is another central requirement in matching markets, widely adopted in applications such as school choice…
We study mechanism which operate on ordinal preference information (i.e., rank ordered lists of alternatives) on the full domain of weak preferences that admits indifferences. We present a novel decomposition of strategyproofness into three…
This paper links matching markets with aligned preferences to optimal transport theory. We show that stability, efficiency, and fairness emerge as solutions to a parametric family of optimal transport problems. The parameter reflects…
Problem definition: In many matching markets, some agents are fully flexible, while others only accept a subset of jobs. For example, ridesharing drivers can specify on the platform the destinations they are willing to accept. Conventional…
We analyze the problem of locating a public facility in a domain of single-peaked and single-dipped preferences when the social planner knows the type of preference (single-peaked or single-dipped) of each agent. Our main result…
This paper studies how a fixed flexibility budget should be allocated across the two sides of a balanced bipartite matching market. We model compatibilities via a sparse bipartite stochastic block model in which flexible agents are more…
Evidence suggests that participants in strategy-proof matching mechanisms play dominated strategies. To explain the data, we introduce expectation-based loss aversion into a school-choice setting and characterize choice-acclimating personal…