Related papers: PARAM: A Microprocessor Hardened for Power Side-Ch…

In the last years, a series of side channels have been discovered on CPUs. These side channels have been used in powerful attacks, e.g., on cryptographic implementations, or as building blocks in transient-execution attacks such as Spectre…

Cyber-physical systems rely on sensors, communication, and computing, all powered by integrated circuits (ICs). ICs are largely susceptible to various hardware attacks with malicious intents. One of the stealthiest threats is the insertion…

The Internet of Things (IoT) has revolutionized connectivity by linking billions of devices worldwide. However, this rapid expansion has also introduced severe security vulnerabilities, making IoT devices attractive targets for malware such…

Machine learning (ML) models can be trade secrets due to their development cost. Hence, they need protection against malicious forms of reverse engineering (e.g., in IP piracy). With a growing shift of ML to the edge devices, in part for…

Cryptography is vital for data security, but cryptographic algorithms can still be vulnerable to side-channel attacks (SCAs), physical assaults exploiting power consumption and EM radiation. SCAs pose a significant threat to cryptographic…

This paper demonstrates a power analysis-based Side-Channel Analysis (SCA) attack on the SNOW-V encryption algorithm, which is a 5G mobile communication security standard candidate. Implemented on an STM32 microcontroller, power traces…

Compression is an emerging source of exploitable side-channel leakage that threatens data security, particularly in web applications where compression is indispensable for performance reasons. Current approaches to mitigating compression…

The impeccable design of sensitive and cryptographic circuits (CC) against fault injection attacks is essential for modern data storage, communication, and computation systems that are susceptible to fault injection attacks. The robustness…

While side-channel leakage is traditionally evaluated from a fabricated chip, it is more time-efficient and cost-effective to do so during the design phase of the chip. We present a methodology to rank the gates of a design according to…

Printed electronics have gained significant traction in recent years, presenting a viable path to integrating computing into everyday items, from disposable products to low-cost healthcare. However, the adoption of computing in these…

Microarchitectural timing attacks exploit subtle timing variations caused by hardware behaviors to leak sensitive information. In this paper, we introduce MCHammer, a novel side-channel technique that leverages machine clears induced by…

GPUs are increasingly being used in security applications, especially for accelerating encryption/decryption. While GPUs are an attractive platform in terms of performance, the security of these devices raises a number of concerns. One…

In recent years we have seen an explosion in the usage of low-cost, low-power microcontrollers (MCUs) in embedded devices around us due to the popularity of Internet of Things (IoT) devices. Although this is good from an economics…

The challenge of designing an efficient Medium Access Control (MAC) protocol and analyzing it has been an important research topic for over 30 years. This paper focuses on the performance analysis (through simulation) and modification of a…

Security critical software, e.g., OpenSSL, comes with numerous side-channel leakages left unpatched due to a lack of resources or experts. The situation will only worsen as the pace of code development accelerates, with developers relying…

Over the past few years, several research groups have introduced innovative hardware designs for Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs), aiming to secure applications against potentially compromised privileged software, including the kernel.…

The CMOS integrated chips at advanced technology nodes are becoming more vulnerable to various sources of faults like manufacturing imprecisions, variations, aging, etc. Additionally, the intentional fault attacks (e.g., high power…

We propose a modification to the transpiler of a quantum computer to safeguard against side-channel attacks aimed at learning information about a quantum circuit. We demonstrate that if it is feasible to shield a specific subset of gates…

We introduce IMPACT, a set of high-throughput main memory-based timing attacks that leverage characteristics of processing-in-memory (PiM) architectures to establish covert and side channels. IMPACT enables high-throughput communication and…

Side-channel attacks on shared hardware resources increasingly threaten confidentiality, especially with the rise of Large Language Models (LLMs). In this work, we introduce Spill The Beans, a novel application of cache side-channels to…