Related papers: PARAM: A Microprocessor Hardened for Power Side-Ch…
Timing side-channel attacks pose a major threat to embedded systems due to their ease of accessibility. We propose CIDPro, a framework that relies on dynamic program diversification to mitigate timing side-channel leakage. The proposed…
Timing and cache side channels provide powerful attacks against many sensitive operations including cryptographic implementations. Existing defenses cannot protect against all classes of such attacks without incurring prohibitive…
Supervised deep learning has emerged as an effective tool for carrying out power side-channel attacks on cryptographic implementations. While increasingly-powerful deep learning-based attacks are regularly published, comparatively-little…
Satellites are highly vulnerable to adversarial glitches or high-energy radiation in space, which could cause faults on the onboard computer. Various radiation- and fault-tolerant methods, such as error correction codes (ECC) and…
Attacks on the microarchitecture of modern processors have become a practical threat to security and privacy in desktop and cloud computing. Recently, cache attacks have successfully been demonstrated on ARM based mobile devices, suggesting…
This work presents a novel, black-box software-based countermeasure against physical attacks including power side-channel and fault-injection attacks. The approach uses the concept of random self-reducibility and self-correctness to add…
Model extraction is a growing concern for the security of AI systems. For deep neural network models, the architecture is the most important information an adversary aims to recover. Being a sequence of repeated computation blocks, neural…
Side channel attacks are a major security concern for smart cards and other embedded devices. They analyze the variations on the power consumption to find the secret key of the encryption algorithm implemented within the security IC. To…
Timing channels enable data leakage that threatens the security of computer systems, from cloud platforms to smartphones and browsers executing untrusted third-party code. Preventing unauthorised information flow is a core duty of the…
We introduce a new timing side-channel attack on Intel CPU processors. Our Frontal attack exploits timing differences that arise from how the CPU frontend fetches and processes instructions while being interrupted. In particular, we observe…
Side channel attacks (SCAs) remain a significant threat to the security of cryptographic systems in modern embedded devices. Even mathematically secure cryptographic algorithms, when implemented in hardware, inadvertently leak information…
We note that constituent fields (notably the fraction-of-seconds timestamp field) in the data payload structure of the synchrophasor communication protocol (IEEE C37.118 standard) are overprovisioned relative to real-world usage and needs,…
Lightweight block ciphers have been widely used in applications such as RFID tags, IoTs, and network sensors. Among them, with comparable parameters, the Light Encryption Device (LED) block cipher achieves the smallest area. However,…
Traditional side-channels take advantage of secrets being used as inputs to unsafe instructions, used for memory accesses, or used in control flow decisions. Constant-time programming, which restricts such code patterns, has been widely…
Control-flow leakage (CFL) attacks enable an attacker to expose control-flow decisions of a victim program via side-channel observations. Linearization (i.e., elimination) of secret-dependent control flow is the main countermeasure against…
Microarchitectural timing side channels have been thoroughly investigated as a security threat in hardware designs featuring shared buffers (e.g., caches) or parallelism between attacker and victim task execution. However, contradicting…
Screaming-channel attacks enable Electromagnetic (EM) Side-Channel Attacks (SCAs) at larger distances due to higher EM leakage energies than traditional SCAs, relaxing the requirement of close access to the victim. This attack can be…
Arm Cortex-M processors are the most widely used 32-bit microcontrollers among embedded and Internet-of-Things devices. Despite the widespread usage, there has been little effort in summarizing their hardware security features,…
The transient-execution attack Meltdown leaks sensitive information by transiently accessing inaccessible data during out-of-order execution. Although Meltdown is fixed in hardware for recent CPU generations, most currently-deployed CPUs…
Microarchitectural attacks have become more threatening the hardware security than before with the increasing diversity of attacks such as Spectre and Meltdown. Vendor patches cannot keep up with the pace of the new threats, which makes the…