Related papers: Existential Types for Relaxed Noninterference
Information-flow security typing statically preserves confidentiality by enforcing noninterference. To address the practical need of selective and flexible declassification of confidential information, several approaches have developed a…
Language-based information flow methods offer a principled way to enforce strong security properties, but enforcing noninterference is too inflexible for realistic applications. Security-typed languages have therefore introduced…
Noninterference is a popular semantic security condition because it offers strong end-to-end guarantees, it is inherently compositional, and it can be enforced using a simple security type system. Unfortunately, it is too restrictive for…
Information flow control type systems statically restrict the propagation of sensitive data to ensure end-to-end confidentiality. The property to be shown is noninterference, asserting that an attacker cannot infer any secrets from made…
Protecting confidential data from leaking is a critical challenge in computer systems, particularly given the growing number of observers on the internet. Therefore, limiting information flow using robust security policies becomes…
In this thesis we consider the problem of information hiding in the scenarios of interactive systems, statistical disclosure control, and refinement of specifications. We apply quantitative approaches to information flow in the first two…
Information flow type systems enforce the security property of noninterference by detecting unauthorized data flows at compile-time. However, they require precise type annotations, making them difficult to use in practice as much of the…
Constant-time programming is a countermeasure to prevent cache based attacks where programs should not perform memory accesses that depend on secrets. In some cases this policy can be safely relaxed if one can prove that the program does…
Noninterference guarantees that an attacker cannot infer secrets by interacting with a program. Information flow control (IFC) type systems assert noninterference by tracking the level of information learned (pc) and disallowing…
In automated complexity analysis, noninterference-based type systems statically guarantee, via soundness, the property that well-typed programs compute functions of a given complexity class, e.g., the class FP of functions computable in…
This paper investigates a flow- and path-sensitive static information flow analysis. Compared with security type systems with fixed labels, it has been shown that flow-sensitive type systems accept more secure programs. We show that an…
Language-based information flow security aims to decide whether an action-observable program can unintentionally leak confidential information if it has the authority to access confidential data. Recent concerns about declassification…
This work provides a study to demonstrate the potential of using off-the-shelf programming languages and their theories to build sound language-based-security tools. Our study focuses on information flow security encompassing…
Noninterference offers a rigorous end-to-end guarantee for secure propagation of information. However, real-world systems almost always involve security requirements that change during program execution, making noninterference inapplicable.…
Mobile apps can access a wide variety of secure information, such as contacts and location. However, current mobile platforms include only coarse access control mechanisms to protect such data. In this paper, we introduce interaction-based…
We present a deductive approach for the analysis of secure information flows with support for fine-grained policies that include declassifications in the form of delimited information release. By explicitly tracking the dependencies of…
Type-level programming is an increasingly popular way to obtain additional type safety. Unfortunately, it remains a second-class citizen in the majority of industrially-used programming languages. We propose a new dependently-typed system…
We propose a new sheaf semantics for secure information flow over a space of abstract behaviors, based on synthetic domain theory: security classes are open/closed partitions, types are sheaves, and redaction of sensitive information…
Noninterference provides a control over information flow in a system for ensuring confidentiality and integrity properties. In the literature this notion has been well studied as transitive noninterference and intransitive noninterference.…
We introduce a novel type system for enforcing secure information flow in an imperative language. Our work is motivated by the problem of statically checking potential information leakage in Android applications. To this end, we design a…