Related papers: Existential Types for Relaxed Noninterference

Type systems hide data that is captured by function closures in function types. In most cases this is a beneficial design that favors simplicity and compositionality. However, some applications require explicit information about the data…

We consider CCS with value passing and elaborate a notion of noninterference for the process calculi, which matches closely that of the programming language. The idea is to view channels as information carriers rather than as "events", so…

Synchronous reactive data flow is a paradigm that provides a high-level abstract programming model for embedded and cyber-physical systems, including the locally synchronous components of IoT systems. Security in such systems is severely…

Language-based information flow control (IFC) enables reasoning about and enforcing security policies in decentralized applications. While information flow properties are relatively extensional and compositional, designing expressive…

We present a taxonomy and an algebra for attack patterns on component-based operating systems. In a multilevel security scenario, where isolation of partitions containing data at different security classifications is the primary security…

Data protection laws such as GDPR aim to give users unprecedented control over their personal data. Compliance with these regulations requires systematically considering information flow and interactions among entities handling sensitive…

Session types have emerged as a typing discipline for communication protocols. Existing calculi with session types come equipped with many different primitives that combine communication with the introduction or elimination of the…

Language-based information flow control (IFC) tracks dependencies within a program using sensitivity labels and prohibits public outputs from depending on secret inputs. In particular, literature has proposed several type systems for…

Practitioners of secure information flow often face a design challenge: what is the right semantic treatment of leaks via termination? On the one hand, the potential harm of untrusted code calls for strong progress-sensitive security. On…

Natural language processing (NLP) models may leak private information in different ways, including membership inference, reconstruction or attribute inference attacks. Sensitive information may not be explicit in the text, but hidden in…

We present a type theory combining both linearity and dependency by stratifying typing rules into a level for logics and a level for programs. The distinction between logics and programs decouples their semantics, allowing the type system…

Information-flow control systems often enforce progress-insensitive noninterference, as it is simple to understand and enforce. Unfortunately, real programs need to declassify results and endorse inputs, which noninterference disallows,…

Implicit authentication consists of a server authenticating a user based on the user's usage profile, instead of/in addition to relying on something the user explicitly knows (passwords, private keys, etc.). While implicit authentication…

To ensure programs do not leak private data, we often want to be able to provide formal guarantees ensuring such data is handled correctly. Often, we cannot keep such data secret entirely; instead programmers specify how private data may be…

We propose a type-based analysis to infer the session protocols of channels in an ML-like concurrent functional language. Combining and extending well-known techniques, we develop a type-checking system that separates the underlying ML type…

Temporal epistemic logic is a well-established framework for expressing agents knowledge and how it evolves over time. Within language-based security these are central issues, for instance in the context of declassification. We propose to…

This paper introduces a run-time mechanism for preventing leakage of secure information in distributed systems. We consider a general concurrency language model, where concurrent objects interact by asynchronous method calls and futures.…

Security of information flow is commonly understood as preventing any information leakage, regardless of how grave or harmless consequences the leakage can have. In this work, we suggest that information security is not a goal in itself,…

Non-interference is a semantic program property that assigns confidentiality levels to data objects and prevents illicit information flows from occurring from high to low security levels. In this paper, we present a novel security model for…

Ensuring privacy during inference stage is crucial to prevent malicious third parties from reconstructing users' private inputs from outputs of public models. Despite a large body of literature on privacy preserving learning (which ensures…