Related papers: Linear-Quadratic Time-Inconsistent Mean-Field Type…

Leader-follower general-sum stochastic games (LF-GSSGs) model sequential decision-making under asymmetric commitment, where a leader commits to a policy and a follower best responds, yielding a strong Stackelberg equilibrium (SSE) with…

This paper is concerned with a general linear quadratic (LQ) control problem of mean-field backward stochastic differential equation (BSDE). Here, the weighting matrices in the cost functional are allowed to be indefinite. Necessary and…

The multi-leader--multi-follower game (MLMFG) involves two or more leaders and followers and serves as a generalization of the Stackelberg game and the single-leader--multi-follower game (SLMFG). Although MLMFG covers wide range of…

This paper addresses the challenge of time-inconsistent stochastic control within a continuous-time framework. Its primary focus lies in uncovering a probabilistic representation, specifically in the shape of a system of backward stochastic…

We study a class of linear-quadratic mean-field games with incomplete information. For each agent, the state is given by a linear forward stochastic differential equation with common noise. Moreover, both the state and control variables can…

In this paper, we consider a linear quadratic stochastic two-person zero-sum differential game. The controls for both players are allowed to appear in both drift and diffusion of the state equation. The weighting matrices in the performance…

Resource competition problems are often modeled using Colonel Blotto games, where players take simultaneous actions. However, many real-world scenarios involve sequential decision-making rather than simultaneous moves. To model these…

A Stackelberg game is played between a leader and a follower. The leader first chooses an action, then the follower plays his best response. The goal of the leader is to pick the action that will maximize his payoff given the follower's…

We study a general linear quadratic mean field type control problem and connect it to mean field games of a similar type. The solution is given both in terms of a forward/backward system of stochastic differential equations and by a pair of…

Two-player mean-payoff Stackelberg games are nonzero-sum infinite duration games played on a bi-weighted graph by Leader (Player 0) and Follower (Player 1). Such games are played sequentially: first, Leader announces her strategy, second,…

Mean field game theory has been developed largely following two routes. One of them, called the direct approach, starts by solving a large-scale game and next derives a set of limiting equations as the population size tends to infinity. The…

We study a two-player Stackelberg game with incomplete information such that the follower's strategy belongs to a known family of parameterized functions with an unknown parameter vector. We design an adaptive learning approach to…

The Stackelberg game model, where a leader commits to a strategy and the follower best responds, has found widespread application, particularly to security problems. In the security setting, the goal is for the leader to compute an optimal…

We introduce and study incentive equilibria for multi-player meanpayoff games. Incentive equilibria generalise well-studied solution concepts such as Nash equilibria and leader equilibria (also known as Stackelberg equilibria). Recall that…

In this paper we formulate and solve a mean-field game described by a linear stochastic dynamics and a quadratic or exponential-quadratic cost functional for each generic player. The optimal strategies for the players are given explicitly…

We prove the global-in-time well-posedness for a broad class of mean field game problems, which is beyond the special linear-quadratic setting, as long as the mean field sensitivity is not too large. Through the stochastic maximum…

We address two-player general-sum stochastic Stackelberg games (SSGs), where the leader's policy is optimized considering the best-response follower whose policy is optimal for its reward under the leader. Existing policy gradient and value…

This paper first presents necessary and sufficient conditions for the solvability of discrete time, mean-field, stochastic linear-quadratic optimal control problems. Then, by introducing several sequences of bounded linear operators, the…

This paper is concerned with a class of linear-quadratic stochastic large-population problems with partial information, where the individual agent only has access to a noisy observation process related to the state. The dynamics of each…

In a multi-follower Bayesian Stackelberg game, a leader plays a mixed strategy over $L$ actions to which $n\ge 1$ followers, each having one of $K$ possible private types, best respond. The leader's optimal strategy depends on the…