Related papers: Linear-Quadratic Time-Inconsistent Mean-Field Type…
We study a continuous-time stochastic Stackelberg game in which a leader seeks to accomplish a primary objective while inferring a hidden parameter of a rational follower. The follower solves an entropy-regularized tracking problem and…
In this paper, we consider a discrete-time Stackelberg mean field game with a leader and an infinite number of followers. The leader and the followers each observe types privately that evolve as conditionally independent controlled Markov…
This paper is concerned with two-person mean-field linear-quadratic non-zero sum stochastic differential games in an infinite horizon. Both open-loop and closed-loop Nash equilibria are introduced. Existence of an open-loop Nash equilibrium…
We study a Stackelberg variant of the classical discrete-time Dynkin game, in which Player 1 (the leader) commits to a stopping strategy first and Player 2 (the follower) responds optimally. This leader-follower structure induces an optimal…
The paper is concerned with a zero-sum Stackelberg stochastic linear-quadratic (LQ, for short) differential game over finite horizons. Under a fairly weak condition, the Stackelberg equilibrium is explicitly obtained by first solving a…
This paper studies social optima and Nash games for mean field linear quadratic control systems, where subsystems are coupled via dynamics and individual costs. For the social control problem, we first obtain a set of forward-backward…
We present a linear--quadratic Stackelberg game with a large number of followers and we also derive the mean field limit of infinitely many followers. The relation between optimization and mean-field limit is studied and conditions for…
Dynamic Stackelberg games are a broad class of two-player games in which the leader acts first, and the follower chooses a response strategy to the leader's strategy. Unfortunately, only stylized Stackelberg games are explicitly solvable…
In this paper, we formulate a general time-inconsistent stochastic linear--quadratic (LQ) control problem. The time-inconsistency arises from the presence of a quadratic term of the expected state as well as a state-dependent term in the…
In multi-agent problems requiring a high degree of cooperation, success often depends on the ability of the agents to adapt to each other's behavior. A natural solution concept in such settings is the Stackelberg equilibrium, in which the…
This paper proposes and studies a class of discrete-time finite-time-horizon Stackelberg mean-field games, with one leader and an infinite number of identical and indistinguishable followers. In this game, the objective of the leader is to…
This paper investigates the so-called asymptotic solvability problem in linear quadratic (LQ) mean field games. The model has asymptotic solvability if for all sufficiently large population sizes, the corresponding game has a set of…
In this paper, a partially observed stochastic linear Stackelberg differential game with mean-variance criteria is studied. Randomness comes from Brownian motions and Poisson random measures. which leads to a circular dependency. We follow…
In this paper, we propose a novel equilibrium solution notion for the time-inconsistent stochastic linear-quadratic optimal control problem. This notion is called the mixed equilibrium solution, which consists of two parts: a…
The Stackelberg equilibrium solution concept describes optimal strategies to commit to: Player 1 (termed the leader) publicly commits to a strategy and Player 2 (termed the follower) plays a best response to this strategy (ties are broken…
We study the time-inconsistent linear quadratic optimal control problem for forward-backward stochastic differential equations with potentially indefinite cost weighting matrices for both the state and the control variables. Our research…
An optimal control problem is considered for linear stochastic differential equations with quadratic cost functional. The coefficients of the state equation and the weights in the cost functional are bounded operators on the spaces of…
We study incentive designs for a class of stochastic Stackelberg games with one leader and a large number of (finite as well as infinite population of) followers. We investigate whether the leader can craft a strategy under a dynamic…
The Stackelberg game depicts a leader-follower relationship wherein decisions are made sequentially, and the Stackelberg equilibrium represents an expected optimal solution when the leader can anticipate the rational response of the…
Guided cooperation allows intelligent agents with heterogeneous capabilities to work together by following a leader-follower type of interaction. However, the associated control problem becomes challenging when the leader agent does not…