Related papers: Behavioral Equivalence of Extensive Game Structure…
A classic model to study strategic decision making in multi-agent systems is the normal-form game. This model can be generalised to allow for an infinite number of pure strategies leading to continuous games. Multi-objective normal-form…
Extensive-form games constitute the standard representation scheme for games with a temporal component. But do all extensive-form games correspond to protocols that we can implement in the real world? We often rule out games with imperfect…
We introduce a minimal model of multilevel selection on structured populations, considering the interplay between game theory and population dynamics. Through a bottleneck process, finite groups are formed with cooperators and defectors…
Simple adaptive procedures that converge to correlated equilibria are known to exist for normal form games (Hart and Mas-Colell 2000), but no such analogue exists for extensive-form games. Leveraging inspiration from Zinkevich et al.…
Game-theoretic characterizations of process equivalences traditionally form a central topic in concurrency; for example, most equivalences on the classical linear-time / branching-time spectrum come with such characterizations. Recent work…
Attack--defense trees are used to describe security weaknesses of a system and possible countermeasures. In this paper, the connection between attack--defense trees and game theory is made explicit. We show that attack--defense trees and…
In the literature of game theory, the information sets of extensive form games have different interpretations, which may lead to confusions and paradoxical cases. We argue that the problem lies in the mix-up of two interpretations of the…
The paper investigates behavioural equivalence between programs in a call-by-value functional language extended with a signature of (algebraic) effect-triggering operations. Two programs are considered as being behaviourally equivalent if…
In this paper, we investigate under which conditions normal-form games are (guaranteed to be) strategically equivalent. First, we show for N-player games (N >= 3) that (A) it is NP-hard to decide whether a given strategy is a best response…
For the same quantum field theory distinct effective actions can be obtained by coupling sources to different choices of field variables. This is the same as considering effective actions for theories related by a change of variables and…
Despite increasing attention paid to the need for fast, scalable methods to analyze next-generation neuroscience data, comparatively little attention has been paid to the development of similar methods for behavioral analysis. Just as the…
We consider extensive games with perfect information with well-founded game trees and study the problems of existence and of characterization of the sets of subgame perfect equilibria in these games. We also provide such characterizations…
We address the problem of solving parity games with imperfect information on finite graphs of bounded structural complexity. It is a major open problem whether parity games with perfect information can be solved in PTIME. Restricting the…
We study strategic similarity of game positions in two-player extensive games of perfect information, by looking at the structure of their local game trees, with the aim of improving the performance of game playing agents in detecting…
Coevolutionary game dynamics is the result of players that may change their strategies and their network of interaction. For such games, and based on interpreting strategies as configurations, strategy-to-payoff maps can be defined for…
Standard game theory assumes that the structure of the game is common knowledge among players. We relax this assumption by considering extensive games where agents may be unaware of the complete structure of the game. In particular, they…
Game theory provides a mathematical framework for analysing strategic situations involving at least two players. Normal-form games model situations where the players simultaneously pick their moves. In this thesis we explore the strategic…
The existence of simple uncoupled no-regret learning dynamics that converge to correlated equilibria in normal-form games is a celebrated result in the theory of multi-agent systems. Specifically, it has been known for more than 20 years…
This paper studies when strategic understanding acquired in one mechanism can be transferred to another. We introduce a framework in which agents' knowledge is represented as a set of payoff comparisons they can make, and use it to…
In this paper we present results and analyses of a class of games in which heterogeneous agents are rewarded for being in a minority group. Each agent possesses a number of fixed strategies each of which are predictors of the next minority…