Related papers: Dividing a Graphical Cake
We study the allocation of indivisible goods that form an undirected graph and quantify the loss of fairness when we impose a constraint that each agent must receive a connected subgraph. Our focus is on well-studied fairness notions…
In the classic cake-cutting problem (Steinhaus, 1948), a heterogeneous resource has to be divided among n agents with different valuations in a proportional way --- giving each agent a piece with a value of at least 1/n of the total. In…
We examine the history of cake cutting mechanisms and discuss the efficiency of their allocations. In the case of piecewise uniform preferences, we define a game that in the presence of strategic agents has equilibria that are not dominated…
We study the fair division of a continuous resource, such as a land-estate or a time-interval, among pre-specified groups of agents, such as families. Each family is given a piece of the resource and this piece is used simultaneously by all…
We study classic cake-cutting problems, but in discrete models rather than using infinite-precision real values, specifically, focusing on their communication complexity. Using general discrete simulations of classical infinite-precision…
We introduce a generalized cake-cutting problem in which we seek to divide multiple cakes so that two players may get their most-preferred piece selections: a choice of one piece from each cake, allowing for the possibility of linked…
The fair division literature in economics considers how to divide resources between multiple agents such that the allocation is envy-free: each agent receives their favorite piece. Researchers have developed a variety of fair division…
A fundamental result in cake cutting states that for any number of players with arbitrary preferences over a cake, there exists a division of the cake such that every player receives a single contiguous piece and no player is left envious.…
In the recently introduced model of fair partitioning of friends, there is a set of agents located on the vertices of an underlying graph that indicates the friendships between the agents. The task is to partition the graph into $k$…
This paper studies fair division of divisible and indivisible items among agents whose cardinal preferences are not necessarily monotone. We establish the existence of fair divisions and develop approximation algorithms to compute them. We…
We consider the problem of envy-free cake cutting, which is the distribution of a continuous heterogeneous resource among self interested players such that nobody prefers what somebody else receives to what they get. Existing work has…
The chore division problem simulates the fair division of a heterogeneous, undesirable resource among several agents. In the fair division of chores, each agent only gets the disutility from its own piece. Agents may, however, also be…
We consider the well-studied cake cutting problem in which the goal is to identify a fair allocation based on a minimal number of queries from the agents. The problem has attracted considerable attention within various branches of computer…
We study the query complexity of cake cutting and give lower and upper bounds for computing approximately envy-free, perfect, and equitable allocations with the minimum number of cuts. The lower bounds are tight for computing connected…
We consider the fair allocation of indivisible items to several agents and add a graph theoretical perspective to this classical problem. Namely, we introduce an incompatibility relation between pairs of items described in terms of a…
We study the discrete variation of the classical cake-cutting problem where n players divide a 1-dimensional cake with exactly (n-1) cuts, replacing the continuous, infinitely divisible "cake" with a necklace of discrete, indivisible…
\textit{Fair division} of resources among competing agents is a fundamental problem in computational social choice and economic game theory. It has been intensively studied on various kinds of items (\textit{divisible} and…
In this article we study the problem of fair division. In particular we study a notion introduced by J. Barbanel that generalizes super envy-free fair division. We give a new proof of his result. Our approach allows us to give an explicit…
Fair division is the problem of dividing one or several goods amongst two or more agents in a way that satisfies a suitable fairness criterion. These Notes provide a succinct introduction to the field. We cover three main topics. First, we…
In Fair AI literature, the practice of maliciously creating unfair models that nevertheless satisfy fairness constraints is known as "cherry-picking". A cherry-picking model is a model that makes mistakes on purpose, selecting bad…