Related papers: Persuasion with Coarse Communication
We consider the problem of covert communication with random slot selection over binary-input Discrete Memoryless Channels and Additive White Gaussian Noise channels, in which a transmitter attempts to reliably communicate with a legitimate…
Strategic communication often relies on anchors observed by the sender but not by the receiver. An analyst may report against a proprietary valuation model, an auditor against an internal score, a manager against an accounting estimate, or…
Consider a market where a seller owns an item for sale and a buyer wants to purchase it. Each player has private information, known as their type. It can be costly and difficult for the players to reach an agreement through direct…
The amount of information transmissible through a communications channel is determined by the noise characteristics of the channel and by the quantities of available transmission resources. In classical information theory, the amount of…
We study a persuasion problem in which a sender designs an information structure to induce a non-Bayesian receiver to take a particular action. The receiver, who is privately informed about his preferences, is a wishful thinker: he is…
The commitment power of senders distinguishes Bayesian persuasion problems from other games with (strategic) communication. Persuasion games with multiple senders have largely studied simultaneous commitment and signalling settings.…
The effect of "good", point-to-point capacity achieving, code sequences on an additional signal, of bounded variance, transmitted over the additive Gaussian noise channel is examined. For such code sequences, it is shown that their effect,…
We consider the multi-sender persuasion problem: multiple players with informational advantage signal to convince a single self-interested actor to take certain actions. This problem generalizes the seminal Bayesian Persuasion framework and…
A formula is derived for the capacity of the Gaussian channel with a benevolent message-cognizant rate-limited helper that provides a noncausal description of the noise to the encoder and decoder. This capacity is strictly larger than when…
We study continuous-time persuasion where a sender controls both how informative a signal is over time and when to stop providing information to a receiver. Given an exogenous signal process, the sender can both garble the evolving signal…
We investigate the capacity of opportunistic communication in the presence of dynamic and distributed spectral activity, i.e. when the time varying spectral holes sensed by the cognitive transmitter are correlated but not identical to those…
We study auctions with severe bounds on the communication allowed: each bidder may only transmit t bits of information to the auctioneer. We consider both welfare- and profit-maximizing auctions under this communication restriction. For…
We investigate two senders and one receiver multiparty communication scenario. Following Phys.Rev.A83, 062112 and arXiv : 2506.07699, we study multiparty communication bounded by dimension and distinguishability. We provide an explicit…
This paper develops a model in which a sender strategically communicates with a group of receivers whose payoffs depend on the sender's information. It is shown that aggregate payoff externalities create an endogenous conflict of interests…
Bayesian persuasion studies how an informed sender should partially disclose information so as to influence the behavior of self-interested receivers. In the last years, a growing attention has been devoted to relaxing the assumption that…
This paper considers the problem of covert communication with mismatched decoding, in which a sender wishes to reliably communicate with a receiver whose decoder is fixed and possibly sub-optimal, and simultaneously to ensure that the…
In the classical communication setting multiple senders having access to the same source of information and transmitting it over channel(s) to a receiver in general leads to a decrease in estimation error at the receiver as compared with…
Resource-constrained systems are prevalent in communications. Such a system is composed of many components but only some of them can be allocated with resources such as time slots. According to the amount of information about the system,…
We study a communication game between an informed sender and an uninformed receiver with repeated interactions and voluntary transfers. Transfers motivate the receiver's decision-making and signal the sender's information. Although full…
We examine receiver-optimal mechanisms for aggregating information divided across many biased senders. Each sender privately observes an unconditionally independent signal about an unknown state, so no sender can verify another's report. A…