Related papers: Robust Contracting in General Contract Spaces
We consider reallocation problems in settings where the initial endowment of each agent consists of a subset of the resources. The private information of the players is their value for every possible subset of the resources. The goal is to…
In this paper, we study a bivariate distributionally robust optimization problem with mean-covariance ambiguity set and half-space support. Under a conventional type of objective function widely adopted in inventory management, option…
We analyze the optimal delegation problem between a principal and an agent, assuming that the latter has state-independent preferences. We demonstrate that if the principal is more risk-averse than the agent toward non-status quo options,…
This work focuses on the problem of distributed optimization in multi-agent cyberphysical systems, where a legitimate agent's iterates are influenced both by the values it receives from potentially malicious neighboring agents, and by its…
Auctions in which agents' payoffs are random variables have received increased attention in recent years. In particular, recent work in algorithmic mechanism design has produced mechanisms employing internal randomization, partly in…
We study the classic principal-agent model when the signal observed by the principal is chosen by the agent. We fully characterize the optimal information structure from an agent's perspective in a general moral hazard setting with limited…
We introduce a dynamic mechanism design problem in which the designer wants to offer for sale an item to an agent, and another item to the same agent at some point in the future. The agent's joint distribution of valuations for the two…
We study the optimal design of electricity contracts among a population of consumers with different needs. This question is tackled within the framework of Principal-Agent problems in presence of adverse selection. The particular features…
This work proposes multi-agent systems setting for concurrent engineering system design optimization and gradually paves the way towards examining graph theoretic constructs in the context of multidisciplinary design optimization problem.…
We study the robust regulation of contracts in moral hazard problems. A firm offers a contract to incentivise a worker protected by limited liability. A regulator restricts the set of permissible contracts to (i) improve efficiency and (ii)…
We consider the problem of an agent who faces losses in continuous time over a finite time horizon and may choose to share some of these losses with a counterparty. The agent is uncertain about the true loss distribution and has multiple…
This paper presents a distributed resource selection mechanism for diverse cloud-edge environments, enabling dynamic and context-aware allocation of resources to meet the demands of complex distributed applications. By distributing the…
Quantitative requirements play an important role in the context of multi-agent systems, where there is often a trade-off between the tasks of individual agents and the constraints that the agents must jointly adhere to. We study multi-agent…
Contracts are a well-established approach for describing and analyzing behavioral aspects of web service compositions. The theory of contracts comes equipped with a notion of compatibility between clients and servers that ensures that every…
We consider the principal-agent problem with heterogeneous agents. Previous works assume that the principal signs independent incentive contracts with every agent to make them invest more efforts on the tasks. However, in many…
We study a two-period moral hazard problem; there are two agents, with action sets that are unknown to the principal. The principal contracts with each agent sequentially, and seeks to maximize the worst-case discounted sum of payoffs,…
This paper studies the consensus problem of general linear discrete-time multi-agent systems (MAS) with input constraints and bounded time-varying communication delays. We propose a robust distributed model predictive control (DMPC)…
We study a market mechanism that sets edge prices to incentivize strategic agents to efficiently share limited network capacity. In this market, agents form coalitions, with each coalition sharing a unit capacity of a selected route and…
We study mechanism design when a designer repeatedly uses a fixed mechanism to interact with strategic agents who learn from observing their allocations. We introduce a static framework, calibrated mechanism design, requiring mechanisms to…
An agent chooses an action based on her private information and a recommendation from an informed but potentially misaligned adviser. With a known probability, the adviser truthfully reports his signal; with the remaining probability, he…