Related papers: Robust Contracting in General Contract Spaces
Training models that perform well under distribution shifts is a central challenge in machine learning. In this paper, we introduce a modeling framework where, in addition to training data, we have partial structural knowledge of the…
Trajectory optimization and model predictive control are essential techniques underpinning advanced robotic applications, ranging from autonomous driving to full-body humanoid control. State-of-the-art algorithms have focused on data-driven…
Reusable software components need expressive specifications. This paper outlines a rigorous foundation to model-based contracts, a method to equip classes with strong contracts that support accurate design, implementation, and formal…
Healthcare systems are facing serious challenges in balancing their human resources to cope with volatile service demand, while at the same time providing necessary job satisfaction to the healthcare workers. We propose in this paper a…
Decentralized coordination and digital contracting are becoming critical in complex industrial ecosystems, yet existing approaches often rely on ad hoc heuristics or purely technical blockchain implementations without a rigorous economic…
Contract-based design is a promising methodology for taming the complexity of developing sophisticated systems. A formal contract distinguishes between assumptions, which are constraints that the designer of a component puts on the…
We investigate mechanism design without payments when agents have different types of preferences. Contrary to most settings in the literature where agents have the same preference, e.g. in the facility location games all agents would like…
In principal-agent models, a principal offers a contract to an agent to perform a certain task. The agent exerts a level of effort that maximizes her utility. The principal is oblivious to the agent's chosen level of effort, and conditions…
We design two mechanisms that ensure that the majority preferred option wins in all equilibria. The first one is a simultaneous game where agents choose other agents to cooperate with on top of the vote for an alternative, thus overcoming…
A set of many identical interacting agents obeying a global additive constraint is considered. Under the hypothesis of equiprobability in the high-dimensional volume delimited in phase space by the constraint, the statistical behavior of a…
We introduce a novel model of contracts with combinatorial actions that accounts for sequential and adaptive agent behavior. As in the standard model, a principal delegates the execution of a costly project to an agent. There are $n$…
In the distributed optimization problem for a multi-agent system, each agent knows a local function and must find a minimizer of the sum of all agents' local functions by performing a combination of local gradient evaluations and…
Following the recent literature on make take fees policies, we consider an exchange wishing to set a suitable contract with several market makers in order to improve trading quality on its platform. To do so, we use a principal-agent…
We study the robust sequential screening problem of a monopolist seller of multiple cloud computing services facing a buyer who has private information about his demand distribution for these services. At the time of contracting, the buyer…
A principal uses payments conditioned on stochastic outcomes of a team project to elicit costly effort from the team members. We develop a multi-agent generalization of a classic first-order approach to contract optimization by leveraging…
The problem of assigning agents to tasks is a central computational challenge in many multi-agent autonomous systems. However, in the real world, agents are not always perfect and may fail due to a number of reasons. A motivating…
We study mechanisms for the facility location problem augmented with predictions of the optimal facility location. We demonstrate that an egalitarian viewpoint which considers both the maximum distance of any agent from the facility and the…
We study a principal-agent team production model. The principal hires a team of agents to participate in a common production task. The exact effort of each agent is unobservable and unverifiable, but the total production outcome (e.g. the…
We study revenue maximization in a buyer-seller setting where the seller has a single object and the buyer has both a private valuation and a private budget. Private budgets complicate the classic single-product monopoly problem, making…
A general nonlinear $1$st-order consensus-based solution for distributed constrained convex optimization is proposed with network resource allocation applications. The solution is used to optimize continuously-differentiable strictly convex…