Related papers: The Persuasion Duality
We study a dynamic Bayesian persuasion model called Markovian persuasion. In such a model, the belief of the receiver regarding the current state of a Markov chain $(X_n)_{n\geq 1}$, over a finite state space $K$, is controlled through…
In this paper, we study axiomatic foundations of Bayesian persuasion, where a principal (i.e., sender) delegates the task of choice making after informing a biased agent (i.e., receiver) about the payoff relevant uncertain state (see, e.g.,…
Convex duality for two two different super--replication problems in a continuous time financial market with proportional transaction cost is proved. In this market, static hedging in a finite number of options, in addition to usual dynamic…
Contemporary machine learning methods will try to approach the Bayes error, as it is the lowest possible error any model can achieve. This paper postulates that any decision is composed of not one but two Bayesian decisions and that…
We investigate pricing-hedging duality for American options in discrete time financial models where some assets are traded dynamically and others, e.g. a family of European options, only statically. In the first part of the paper we…
When humans infer underlying probabilities from stochastic observations, they exhibit biases and variability that cannot be explained on the basis of sound, Bayesian manipulations of probability. This is especially salient when beliefs are…
When selling information products, the seller can provide some free partial information to change people's valuations so that the overall revenue can possibly be increased. We study the general problem of advertising information products by…
Bayesian optimization is a sequential method for minimizing objective functions that are expensive to evaluate and about which few assumptions can be made. By using all gathered data to train a Gaussian process model for the function and…
We study a model of persuasion in which the receiver is a `conservative Bayesian' whose updated belief is a convex combination of the prior and the correct Bayesian posterior. While in the classic Bayesian case providing information…
We consider the problem of a firm seeking to use personalized pricing to sell an exogenously given stock of a product over a finite selling horizon to different consumer types. We assume that the type of an arriving consumer can be observed…
The marginal price of electricity traditionally depends on the dual variables associated with relevant optimization goals. Particularly, in the optimal power flow realm, prices represent the cost of supplying an additional unit of power at…
We explore whether ambiguous communication can be beneficial to the sender in a persuasion problem, when the receiver (and possibly the sender) is ambiguity averse. Our analysis highlights the necessity of using a collection of experiments…
We investigate a seller's revenue-maximizing mechanism in a setting where a desirable good is sold together with an undesirable bad (e.g., advertisements) that generates third-party revenue. The buyer's private information is…
Motivated by the problem of selling large, proprietary data, we consider an information pricing problem proposed by Bergemann et al. that involves a decision-making buyer and a monopolistic seller. The seller has access to the underlying…
We study how delegating pricing to large language models (LLMs) can facilitate collusion in a duopoly when both sellers rely on the same pre-trained model. The LLM is characterized by (i) a propensity parameter capturing its internal bias…
Modeling parts of an optimization problem as an optimal value function that depends on a top-level decision variable is a regular occurrence in optimization and an essential ingredient for methods such as Benders Decomposition. It often…
According to conventional wisdom, ambiguity accelerates optimal timing by decreasing the value of waiting in comparison with the unambiguous benchmark case. We study this mechanism in a multidimensional setting and show that in a…
We study the classic single-item auction setting of Myerson, but under the assumption that the buyers' values for the item are distributed over finite supports. Using strong LP duality and polyhedral theory, we rederive various key results…
We provide a model-free pricing-hedging duality in continuous time. For a frictionless market consisting of $d$ risky assets with continuous price trajectories, we show that the purely analytic problem of finding the minimal superhedging…
We consider a persuasion problem between a sender and a receiver whose utility may be nonlinear in her belief; we call such receivers risk-conscious. Such utility models arise when the receiver exhibits systematic biases away from…