Related papers: Cost Sharing over Combinatorial Domains: Complemen…

This paper derives polynomial-time approximation schemes for several NP-hard stochastic optimization problems from the algorithmic mechanism design and operations research literatures. The problems we consider involve a principal or seller…

Submodular optimization generalizes many classic problems in combinatorial optimization and has recently found a wide range of applications in machine learning (e.g., feature engineering and active learning). For many large-scale…

We present a novel optimization method, named the Combined Optimization Method (COM), for the joint optimization of two or more cost functions. Unlike the conventional joint optimization schemes, which try to find minima in a weighted sum…

Many engineered systems must balance competing objectives, such as performance and safety, cost and reliability, or efficiency and sustainability, and are naturally modeled as compositions of interacting subsystems. We study online…

We consider optimal mechanism design for the case with one buyer and two items. The buyer's valuations towards the two items are independent and additive. In this setting, optimal mechanism is unknown for general valuation distributions. We…

There is only one technique for prior-free optimal mechanism design that generalizes beyond the structurally benevolent setting of digital goods. This technique uses random sampling to estimate the distribution of agent values and then…

Decarbonizing electric grids is a crucial global endeavor in the pursuit of carbon neutrality. Taking carbon emissions from generation into account when pricing electricity usage is an essential way to achieve this goal. However, such…

In [1], a single-period co-optimization model of energy and reserve is considered to better illustrate the properties of the co-optimization model and the associated market mechanism. To make the discussion more general, in this paper, the…

We study the problem of aggregating distributions, such as budget proposals, into a collective distribution. An ideal aggregation mechanism would be Pareto efficient, strategyproof, and fair. Most previous work assumes that agents evaluate…

This paper focuses on the coordination of a large population of dynamic agents with private information over multiple periods. Each agent maximizes the individual utility, while the coordinator determines the market rule to achieve group…

A fundamental component of the game theoretic approach to distributed control is the design of local utility functions.Relative to resource allocation problems that are additive over the resources, Part I showed how to design local…

In settings where full incentive-compatibility is not available, such as core-constraint combinatorial auctions and budget-balanced combinatorial exchanges, we may wish to design mechanisms that are as incentive-compatible as possible. This…

Complements between goods - where one good takes on added value in the presence of another - have been a thorn in the side of algorithmic mechanism designers. On the one hand, complements are common in the standard motivating applications…

This study proposes a tractable stochastic choice model to identify motivations for prosocial behavior, and to explore alternative motivations of deliberate randomization beyond ex-ante fairness concerns. To represent social preferences, we…

Incentive mechanism design has aroused extensive attention for crowdsourcing applications in recent years. Most research assumes that participants are already in the system and aware of the existence of crowdsourcing tasks. Whereas in real…

We study risk-free bidding strategies in combinatorial auctions with incomplete information. Specifically, what is the maximum profit that a complement-free (subadditive) bidder can guarantee in a multi-item combinatorial auction? Suppose…

Muscles crossing a joint usually outnumber its degrees of freedom, which renders the motor system underdetermined. Typically, optimization laws are postulated to cope with this redundancy. A natural question then arises whether all muscular…

We study mechanism design when a designer repeatedly uses a fixed mechanism to interact with strategic agents who learn from observing their allocations. We introduce a static framework, calibrated mechanism design, requiring mechanisms to…

Mechanism design for a social utility being the sum of agents' utilities (SoU) is a well-studied problem. There are, however, a number of problems of theoretical and practical interest where a designer may have a different objective than…

We consider "time-of-use" pricing as a technique for matching supply and demand of temporal resources with the goal of maximizing social welfare. Relevant examples include energy, computing resources on a cloud computing platform, and…