Related papers: Robust Monopoly Regulation
This paper studies the design of mechanisms that are robust to misspecification. We introduce a novel notion of robustness that connects a variety of disparate approaches and study its implications in a wide class of mechanism design…
A seller offers a buyer a schedule of transfers and associated product qualities. After observing this schedule, the buyer chooses a flexible costly signal about his type. We show it is without loss to focus on a class of mechanisms that…
This paper studies the problem of optimal investment in incomplete markets, robust with respect to stopping times. We work on a Brownian motion framework and the stopping times are adapted to the Brownian filtration. Robustness can only be…
We introduce a quantitative approach to comparative statics that allows to bound the maximum effect of an exogenous parameter change on a system's equilibrium. The motivation for this approach is a well known paradox in multimarket Cournot…
In practical optimization problems, we typically model uncertainty as a random variable though its true probability distribution is unobservable to the decision maker. Historical data provides some information of this distribution that we…
We study a mechanism design problem where a seller aims to allocate a good to multiple bidders, each with a private value. The seller supports or favors a specific group, referred to as the minority group. Specifically, the seller requires…
Constrained decision-making is essential for designing safe policies in real-world control systems, yet simulated environments often fail to capture real-world adversities. We consider the problem of learning a policy that will maximize the…
We study multi-product monopoly pricing where the seller jointly designs the selling mechanism and the information structure for the buyer to learn his values. Unlike the case with exogenous information, we show that when the seller…
We study the pricing problem faced by a firm that sells a large number of products, described via a wide range of features, to customers that arrive over time. Customers independently make purchasing decisions according to a general choice…
A multi-product monopolist faces a buyer who is privately informed about his valuations for the goods. As is well-known, optimal mechanisms are in general complicated, while simple mechanisms -- such as pure bundling or separate sales --…
A monopoly platform sells either a risky product (with unknown utility) or a safe product (with known utility) to agents who sequentially arrive and learn the utility of the risky product by the reporting of previous agents. It is costly…
When selling many goods with independent valuations, we develop a distributionally robust framework, consisting of a two-player game between seller and nature. The seller has only limited knowledge about the value distribution. The seller…
This paper considers the distributed robust suboptimal consensus control problem of linear multi-agent systems, with both H2 and H_infty performance requirements. A novel two-step complementary design approach is proposed. In the first…
We develop a method to solve, theoretically and numerically, general optimal stopping problems. Our general setting allows for multiple exercise rights, i.e., optimal multiple stopping, for a robust evaluation that accounts for model…
Robust control design is mainly devoted to guarantee closed-loop stability of a model-based control law in presence of parametric and structural uncertainties. The control law is usually a complex feedback law which is derived from a…
This paper studies a monopolist selling multiple goods to a consumer with one-dimensional private types. I provide a sufficient condition under which the monopolist's problem is equivalent to finding the upper envelope of the marginal…
This paper considers nonlinear regular-singular stochastic optimal control of large insurance company. The company controls the reinsurance rate and dividend payout process to maximize the expected present value of the dividend pay-outs…
Data regulations increasingly enable consumers to switch among market segments, making segmentation an endogenous outcome of strategic interaction. We study a model in which consumers choose segments before a monopolist sets…
A decision-maker faces uncertainty governed by a data-generating process (DGP), which is only known to belong to a set of sequences of independent but possibly non-identical distributions. A robust decision maximizes the expected payoff…
Distributionally robust control is a well-studied framework for optimal decision making under uncertainty, with the objective of minimizing an expected cost function over control actions, assuming the most adverse probability distribution…