Related papers: Global Convergence for Replicator Dynamics of Repe…
In many societal and industrial interactions, participants generally prefer their pure self-interest at the expense of the global welfare. Known as social dilemmas, this category of non-cooperative games offers situations where multiple…
This paper extends the notion of learning equilibrium in game theory from matrix games to stochastic games. We introduce Foolproof Cooperative Learning (FCL), an algorithm that converges to a Tit-for-Tat behavior. It allows cooperative…
Consider the scenario where an infinite number of players (i.e., the \textit{thermodynamic} limit) find themselves in a Prisoner's dilemma type situation, in a \textit{repeated} setting. Is it reasonable to anticipate that, in these…
The Optional Public Goods Game is a three-strategy game in which an individual can play as a cooperator or defector or decide not to participate. Despite its simplicity, this model can effectively represent many human social dilemmas, such…
Tolerance implies enduring trying circumstances with a fair and objective attitude. To determine whether evolutionary advantages might be stemming from diverse levels of tolerance in a population, we study a spatial public goods game, where…
We consider a stochastic model for evolution of group-structured populations in which interactions between group members correspond to the Prisoner's Dilemma or the Hawk-Dove game. Selection operates at two organization levels: individuals…
Behavioral experiments on the trust game have shown that trust and trustworthiness are universal among human beings, contradicting the prediction by assuming \emph{Homo economicus} in orthodox Economics. This means some mechanism must be at…
Evolutionary game theory has been an important tool for describing economic and social behaviour for decades. Approximate mean value equations describing the time evolution of strategy concentrations can be derived from the players'…
The paper contains the attempt to integration of the classical evolutionary game theory based on replicator dynamics and the state based approach of Houston and Mcnamara. In the new approach, individuals have different heritable strategies,…
Punishment is a common tactic to sustain cooperation and has been extensively studied for a long time. While most of previous game-theoretic work adopt the imitation learning where players imitate the strategies who are better off, the…
Decision-making individuals often imitate their highest-earning fellows rather than optimize their own utilities, due to bounded rationality and incomplete information. Perpetual fluctuations between decisions have been reported as the…
Feedbacks between strategies and the environment are common in social-ecological, evolutionary-ecological, and even psychological-economic systems. Utilizing common resources is always a dilemma for community members, like tragedy of the…
We consider the problem of distributed convergence to efficient outcomes in coordination games through dynamics based on aspiration learning. Under aspiration learning, a player continues to play an action as long as the rewards received…
Zero-determinant (ZD) strategies, a recently found novel class of strategies in repeated games, has attracted much attention in evolutionary game theory. A ZD strategy unilaterally enforces a linear relation between average payoffs of…
The theory of repeated games analyzes the long-term relationship of interacting players and mathematically reveals the condition of how cooperation is achieved, which is not achieved in a one-shot game. In the repeated prisoner's dilemma…
In many social dilemmas, individuals tend to generate a situation with low payoffs instead of a system optimum ("tragedy of the commons"). Is the routing of traffic a similar problem? In order to address this question, we present…
The replicator equation in evolutionary game theory describes the change in a population's behaviors over time given suitable incentives. It arises when individuals make decisions using a simple learning process - imitation. A recent…
We study the phase diagram of a minority game where three classes of agents are present. Two types of agents play a risk-loving game that we model by the standard Snowdrift Game. The behaviour of the third type of agents is coded by {\em…
A network model based on players' aspirations is proposed and analyzed theoretically and numerically within the framework of evolutionary game theory. In this model, players decide whether to cooperate or defect by comparing their payoffs…
"Three is a crowd" is an old proverb that applies as much to social interactions, as it does to frustrated configurations in statistical physics models. Accordingly, social relations within a triangle deserve special attention. With this…