Related papers: Generalized DC loop current attack against the KLJ…
We present the wavelength attack on a practical continuous-variable quantum-key-distribution system with a heterodyne protocol, in which the transmittance of beam splitters at Bob's station is wavelength-dependent. Our strategy is proposed…
Alice communicates with words drawn uniformly amongst $\{\ket{j}\}_{j=1..n}$, the canonical orthonormal basis. Sometimes however Alice interleaves quantum decoys $\{\frac{\ket{j}+i\ket{k}}{\sqrt{2}}\}$ between her messages. Such pairwise…
In this paper we present finite-key security analysis for quantum key distribution protocol based on weak coherent (in particular phase-coded) states using a fully quantum asymptotic equipartition property technique. This work is the…
We revisit the practical implementation of high-dimensional quantum key distribution protocol using path entanglement reported in [Phys.Rev.Lett.~127,~110505,~2021]. Here we refine the noise robustness analysis performed there by simulating…
The discrete-variable QKD protocols based on BB84 are known to be secure against an eavesdropper, Eve, intercepting the flying qubits and performing any quantum operation on them. However, these protocols may still be vulnerable to…
A pair of Kirchhoff-Loop-Johnson(-like)-Noise communicators, which is able to work over variable ranges, was designed and built. Tests have been carried out on a model-line performance characteristics were obtained for ranges beyond the…
We survey the most important results and some recent developments about the secure key exchange protocol where the security is based on the Second Law of Thermodynamics and the robustness of classical physical information. We conclude that…
In this paper we present the quantum control attack on quantum key distribution systems. The cornerstone of the attack is that Eve can use unitary (polar) decomposition of her positive-operator valued measure elements, which allows her to…
Measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution protocol, whose security analysis does not rely on any assumption on the detection system, can immune the attacking against detectors. We give a first composable security analysis for…
We identify and study a new security loophole in continuous-variable quantum key distribution (CV-QKD) implementations, related to the imperfect linearity of the homodyne detector. By exploiting this loophole, we propose an active…
In this paper, we introduce the Kirchhoff-Law-Johnson-Noise (KLJN) as an approach to securing satellite communications. KLJN has the potential to revolutionize satellite communication security through its combination of simplicity,…
In a deterministic quantum key distribution (DQKD) protocol with a two-way quantum channel, Bob sends a qubit to Alice who then encodes a key bit onto the qubit and sends it back to Bob. After measuring the returned qubit, Bob can obtain…
Remarkably, it has been shown that in principle, security proofs for quantum key-distribution (QKD) protocols can be independent of assumptions on the devices used and even of the fact that the adversary is limited by quantum theory. All…
This paper proposes a new scheme to secure the transmissions in an untrusted decode-and-forward (DF) relaying network. A legitimate source node, Alice, sends her data to a legitimate destination node, Bob, with the aid of an untrusted DF…
Vulnerabilities of components used in quantum key distribution (QKD) systems affect its implementation security and must be taken into consideration during system development and security analysis. In this paper, we investigated…
This paper presents a DNN bottleneck reinforcement scheme to alleviate the vulnerability of Deep Neural Networks (DNN) against adversarial attacks. Typical DNN classifiers encode the input image into a compressed latent representation more…
We analyze the performance of continuous-variable quantum key distribution protocols where the entangled source originates not from one of the trusted parties, Alice or Bob, but from the malicious eavesdropper in the middle. This is in…
The security proofs of continuous-variable quantum key distribution are based on the assumptions that the eavesdropper can neither act on the local oscillator nor control Bob's beam splitter. These assumptions may be invalid in practice due…
Recently, we proposed a classical communicator which was inspired by the Kirchhoff-loop-Johnson-like-Noise (KLJN) communicator and was claimed totally secure. Here we withdraw this claim and prove that, similarly to earlier intuitive…
Inserting nonreciprocal devices at the doorways of Alice and Bob is a widely recognized countermeasure against quantum hacking attacks in quantum key distribution (QKD) systems. However, traditional integrated nonreciprocal devices, which…