Related papers: Generalized DC loop current attack against the KLJ…
Security analyses of quantum cryptographic protocols typically rely on certain conditions; one such condition is that the sender (Alice) and receiver (Bob) have isolated devices inaccessible to third parties. If an eavesdropper (Eve) has a…
In the last decade, deep learning algorithms have become very popular thanks to the achieved performance in many machine learning and computer vision tasks. However, most of the deep learning architectures are vulnerable to so called…
This letter proposes a novel hybrid key distribution architecture that jointly exploits quantum key distribution (QKD) and Kirchhoff-law-Johnson-noise (KLJN) statistical-physical key exchange. In the proposed system, an optical BB84-type…
We analyze the security of a quantum secure direct communication protocol equipped with authentication. We first propose a specifc attack on the protocol by which, an adversary can break the secret already shared between Alice and Bob, when…
We analyze realistic vulnerabilities of decoy-state quantum key distribution (QKD) arising from the combination of laser damage attack (LDA) and unambiguous state discrimination (USD). While decoy-state QKD is designed to protect against…
We investigate the physical-layer security of indoor hybrid parallel power-line/wireless orthogonal-frequency division-multiplexing (OFDM) communication systems. We propose an artificial-noise (AN) aided scheme to enhance the system's…
The threat of signal spoofing attacks against GNSS has grown in recent years and has motivated the study of anti-spoofing techniques. However, defense methods have been designed only against specific attacks. This paper introduces a general…
An absolutely secure, fast, inexpensive, robust, maintenance-free and low-power- consumption communication is proposed. The states of the information bit are represented by two resistance values. The sender and the receiver have such…
In this Paper, we investigate the security of Zhang, Li and Guo quantum key distribution via quantum encryption protocol [$\text{Phys. Rev. A} \textbf{64}, 24302 (2001)$] and show that it is not secure against some of Eve's attacks and with…
A well-protected and characterised source in a quantum key distribution system is needed for its security. Unfortunately, the source is vulnerable to light-injection attacks, such as Trojan-horse, laser-seeding, and laser-damage attacks, in…
In practical quantum cryptography, the source sometimes produces multi-photon pulses, thus enabling the eavesdropper Eve to perform the powerful photon-number-splitting (PNS) attack. Recently, it was shown by Curty and Lutkenhaus [Phys.…
We demonstrate that secure quantum key distribution systems based on continuous variables implementations can operate beyond the apparent 3 dB loss limit that is implied by the beam splitting attack . The loss limit was established for…
Evaluating the theoretical limit of the amount of information Eve can steal from a quantum key distribution protocol under given conditions is one of the most important things that need to be done in security proof. In addition to source…
In this paper, we survey the state of the art of the secure key exchange method that is secured by the laws of classical statistical physics, and involves the Kirchhoff's law and the generalized Johnson noise equation, too. We discuss the…
We introduce a quantum key distribution protocol designed to expose fake users that connect to Alice or Bob for the purpose of monopolising the link and denying service. It inherently resists attempts to exhaust Alice and Bob's initial…
Quantum key distribution (QKD) enables secure key sharing between distant parties, with several protocols proven resilient against conventional eavesdropping strategies. Here, we introduce a new attack scenario where an eavesdropper, Eve,…
The article is focused on research of an attack on the quantum key distribution system and proposes a countermeasure method. Particularly noteworthy is that this is not a classic attack on a quantum protocol. We describe an attack on the…
In a former paper [Fluct. Noise Lett., 13 (2014) 1450020] we introduced a vehicular communication system with unconditionally secure key exchange based on the Kirchhoff-Law-Johnson-Noise (KLJN) key distribution scheme. In this paper, we…
An eavesdropper Eve may probe a quantum key distribution (QKD) system by sending a bright pulse from the quantum channel into the system and analyzing the back-reflected pulses. Such Trojan-horse attacks can breach the security of the QKD…
We investigate the possibility of eavesdropping on a quantum key distribution network by local sequential quantum unsharp measurement attacks by the eavesdropper. In particular, we consider a pure two-qubit state shared between two parties…