Related papers: Strategizing against No-regret Learners
Consider a scenario where a player chooses an action in each round $t$ out of $T$ rounds and observes the incurred cost after a delay of $d_{t}$ rounds. The cost functions and the delay sequence are chosen by an adversary. We show that in a…
Bilateral trade models the problem of intermediating between two rational agents -- a seller and a buyer -- both characterized by a private valuation for an item they want to trade. We study the online learning version of the problem, in…
Stackelberg security games are a critical tool for maximizing the utility of limited defense resources to protect important targets from an intelligent adversary. Motivated by green security, where the defender may only observe an…
The existence of simple, uncoupled no-regret dynamics that converge to correlated equilibria in normal-form games is a celebrated result in the theory of multi-agent systems. Specifically, it has been known for more than 20 years that when…
This paper presents a new framework for analyzing and designing no-regret algorithms for dynamic (possibly adversarial) systems. The proposed framework generalizes the popular online convex optimization framework and extends it to its…
Many real-world strategic games involve interactions between multiple players. We study a hierarchical multi-player game structure, where players with asymmetric roles can be separated into leaders and followers, a setting often referred to…
We examine a patient player's behavior when he can build reputations in front of a sequence of myopic opponents. With positive probability, the patient player is a commitment type who plays his Stackelberg action in every period. We…
We study the open question of how players learn to play a social optimum pure-strategy Nash equilibrium (PSNE) through repeated interactions in general-sum coordination games. A social optimum of a game is the stable Pareto-optimal state…
No-regret learning has a long history of being closely connected to game theory. Recent works have devised uncoupled no-regret learning dynamics that, when adopted by all the players in normal-form games, converge to various equilibrium…
Regret minimization has played a key role in online learning, equilibrium computation in games, and reinforcement learning (RL). In this paper, we describe a general model-free RL method for no-regret learning based on repeated…
We consider the problem of a single seller repeatedly selling a single item to a single buyer (specifically, the buyer has a value drawn fresh from known distribution $D$ in every round). Prior work assumes that the buyer is fully rational…
In this paper, we propose a probabilistic game-theoretic model to study the properties of the worst-case regret of the greedy strategy under complete (Knightian) uncertainty. In a game between a decision-maker (DM) and an adversarial agent…
We study a generalization of the online binary prediction with expert advice framework where at each round, the learner is allowed to pick $m\geq 1$ experts from a pool of $K$ experts and the overall utility is a modular or submodular…
This paper considers information sharing in a multi-player repeated game. Every round, each player observes a subset of components of a random vector and then takes a control action. The utility earned by each player depends on the full…
In the literature on game-theoretic equilibrium finding, focus has mainly been on solving a single game in isolation. In practice, however, strategic interactions -- ranging from routing problems to online advertising auctions -- evolve…
We consider the cooperative multi-player version of the stochastic multi-armed bandit problem. We study the regime where the players cannot communicate but have access to shared randomness. In prior work by the first two authors, a strategy…
The study of repeated interactions between a learner and a utility-maximizing optimizer has yielded deep insights into the manipulability of learning algorithms. However, existing literature primarily focuses on independent, unlinked…
In repeated games, strategies are often evaluated by their ability to guarantee the performance of the single best action that is selected in hindsight, a property referred to as \emph{Hannan consistency}, or \emph{no-regret}. However, the…
We consider regret minimization in repeated games with non-convex loss functions. Minimizing the standard notion of regret is computationally intractable. Thus, we define a natural notion of regret which permits efficient optimization and…
A recent line of work has established uncoupled learning dynamics such that, when employed by all players in a game, each player's \emph{regret} after $T$ repetitions grows polylogarithmically in $T$, an exponential improvement over the…