Related papers: Hotelling Games with Random Tolerance Intervals

We study a static game played by a finite number of agents, in which agents are assigned independent and identically distributed random types and each agent minimizes its objective function by choosing from a set of admissible actions that…

We study a recently introduced class of strategic games that is motivated by and generalizes Schelling's well-known residential segregation model. These games are played on undirected graphs, with the set of agents partitioned into multiple…

This work explores three-player game training dynamics, under what conditions three-player games converge and the equilibria the converge on. In contrast to prior work, we examine a three-player game architecture in which all players…

The classical game theory models rational players and proposes Nash equilibrium (NE) as the solution. However, real-world scenarios rarely feature rational players; instead, players make inconsistent and irrational decisions. Often,…

Federated learning aims to train predictive models for data that is distributed across clients, under the orchestration of a server. However, participating clients typically each hold data from a different distribution, whereby predictive…

This work proposes a novel distributed approach for computing a Nash equilibrium in convex games with merely monotone and restricted strongly monotone pseudo-gradients. By leveraging the idea of the centralized operator extrapolation method…

This paper explores distributed Nash equilibrium seeking problems for games in which the players have limited knowledge on other players' actions. In particular, the involved players are considered to be high-order integrators with their…

We study a distributed approach for seeking a Nash equilibrium in $n$-cluster games with strictly monotone mappings. Each player within each cluster has access to the current value of her own smooth local cost function estimated by a…

This paper investigates online stochastic aggregative games subject to local set constraints and time-varying coupled inequality constraints, where each player possesses a time-varying expectation-valued cost function relying on not only…

The theory of learning in games has extensively studied situations where agents respond dynamically to each other by optimizing a fixed utility function. However, in real situations, the strategic environment varies as a result of past…

We propose a two-layer stochastic game model to study reinsurance contracting and competition in a market with one insurer and two competing reinsurers. The insurer negotiates with both reinsurers simultaneously for proportional reinsurance…

We study discounted infinitely repeated games in which players agree on a cooperative mixed action profile but, at each step, observe only the realized pure actions. This form of imperfect monitoring breaks classical trigger strategies,…

In game theory, a trusted mediator acting on behalf of the players can enable the attainment of correlated equilibria, which may provide better payoffs than those available from the Nash equilibria alone. We explore the approach of…

We analyse a non-cooperative strategic game among two ride-hailing platforms, each of which is modeled as a two-sided queueing system, where drivers (with a certain patience level) are assumed to arrive according to a Poisson process at a…

A group of players which contain n sellers and n buyers bargain over the partitions of n pies. A seller(/buyer) has to reach an agreement with a buyer (/seller) on the division of a pie. The players bargain in a system like the stock…

We propose a type of non-cooperative game, termed multi-cluster aggregative game, which is composed of clusters as players, where each cluster consists of collaborative agents with cost functions depending on their own decisions and the…

In many cases the Nash equilibria are not predictive of the experimental players' behaviour. For some games of Game Theory it is proposed here a method to estimate the probabilities with which the different options will be actually chosen…

We consider finite $n$-person deterministic graphical games and study the existence of pure stationary Nash-equilibrium in such games. We assume that all infinite plays are equivalent and form a unique outcome, while each terminal position…

Network congestion games are a convenient model for reasoning about routing problems in a network: agents have to move from a source to a target vertex while avoiding congestion, measured as a cost depending on the number of players using…

Through a stochastic control theoretic approach, we analyze reputation games where a strategic long-lived player acts in a sequential repeated game against a collection of short-lived players. The key assumption in our model is that the…