Related papers: Robust countermeasure against detector control att…
We investigate the security of continuous-variable (CV) quantum key distribution (QKD) using coherent states in the presence of quadrature excess noise. We consider an eavesdropping attack which uses a linear amplifier and beam splitter.…
We study potential security vulnerabilities of a single-photon detector based on superconducting transition-edge sensor. In a simple experiment, we show that an adversary could fake a photon number result at a certain wavelength by sending…
How to remove detector side channel attacks has been a notoriously hard problem in quantum cryptography. Here, we propose a simple solution to this problem---*measurement* device independent quantum key distribution. It not only removes all…
We identify and study a new security loophole in continuous-variable quantum key distribution (CV-QKD) implementations, related to the imperfect linearity of the homodyne detector. By exploiting this loophole, we propose an active…
We present a countermeasure against the detector blinding attack (DBA) utilizing statistical analysis of error and double-click events accumulated during a quantum key distribution session under randomized modulation of single-photon…
Continuous-variable quantum key distribution protocols, based on Gaussian modulation of the quadratures of coherent states, have been implemented in recent experiments. A present limitation of such systems is the finite efficiency of the…
Establishing an information-theoretic secret key between two parties using a quantum key distribution (QKD) system is only possible when an accurate characterization of the quantum channel and proper device calibration routines are…
The eavesdropper technique nowadays is already improved from the theoretical perspective to the experimental perspective. The technique now more focusing on the loopholes of the components used such as modulator, laser, and detector. These…
Counterfactual quantum key distribution (QKD) enables two parties to share a secret key using an interaction-free measurement. Here, we point out that the efficiency of counterfactual QKD protocols can be enhanced by including…
Quantum cryptographic protocols are typically analysed by assuming that potential opponents can carry out all physical operations, an assumption which grants capabilities far in excess of present technology. Adjusting this assumption to…
A new class of quantum cryptography (QC) protocols that are robust against the most general photon number splitting attacks in a weak coherent pulse implementation has been recently proposed. In this article we give a quite exhaustive…
An intercept-resend attack on a continuous-variable quantum-key-distribution protocol is investigated experimentally. By varying the interception fraction, one can implement a family of attacks where the eavesdropper totally controls the…
Entanglement-measurement attack is one of the most famous attacks against quantum cryptography. In quantum cryptography protocols, eavesdropping checking is an effective means to resist this attack. There are currently two commonly used…
Continuous-variable measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution (CV-MDI QKD) can defend all attacks on the measurement devices fundamentally. Consequently, higher requirements are put forward for the source of CV-MDI QKD system.…
We experimentally implemented an eavesdropping attack against the Ekert protocol for quantum key distribution based on the Wigner inequality. We demonstrate a serious lack of security of this protocol when the eavesdropper gains total…
While ideal quantum key distribution (QKD) systems are well-understood, practical implementations face various vulnerabilities, such as side-channel attacks resulting from device imperfections. Current security proofs for decoy-state BB84…
Single photon detectors based on passively-quenched avalanche photodiodes can be temporarily blinded by relatively bright light, of intensity less than a nanowatt. I describe a bright-light regime suitable for attacking a quantum key…
Quantum key distribution (QKD) provides information-theoretic security grounded in the fundamental laws of physics. Nevertheless, practical imperfections can introduce side channels that expose QKD systems to quantum hacking, especially…
We show the detector blinding attack by Lydersen et al [1] will be ineffective on most single photon avalanche photodiodes (APDs) and certainly ineffective on any detectors that are operated correctly. The attack is only successful if a…
In this paper we present the quantum control attack on quantum key distribution systems. The cornerstone of the attack is that Eve can use unitary (polar) decomposition of her positive-operator valued measure elements, which allows her to…