Related papers: Zero-sum Stochastic Games with Asymmetric Informat…

We consider a finite state, finite action, zero-sum stochastic games with data defining the game lying in the ordered field of algebraic numbers. In both the discounted and the limiting average versions of these games we prove that the…

In this paper we consider an infinite horizon zero-sum differential game where the dynamics of each player and the running cost are also depending on the evolution of some discrete (switching) variables. In particular, such switching…

In this paper, an open-loop two-person non-zero sum stochastic differential game is considered for forward-backward stochastic systems. More precisely, the controlled systems are described by a fully coupled nonlinear multi- dimensional…

This paper considers information sharing in a multi-player repeated game. Every round, each player observes a subset of components of a random vector and then takes a control action. The utility earned by each player depends on the full…

We consider a game-theoretic setting to model the interplay between attacker and defender in the context of information flow, and to reason about their optimal strategies. In contrast with standard game theory, in our games the utility of a…

Two-player games on graphs provide the theoretical frame- work for many important problems such as reactive synthesis. While the traditional study of two-player zero-sum games has been extended to multi-player games with several notions of…

We consider a dynamic game with asymmetric information where each player observes privately a noisy version of a (hidden) state of the world V, resulting in dependent private observations. We study structured perfect Bayesian equilibria…

We consider two-player non-zero-sum linear-quadratic Gaussian games in which both players aim to minimize a quadratic cost function while controlling a linear and stochastic state process {using linear policies}. The system is partially…

Conventional noncooperative game theory hypothesizes that the joint strategy of a set of players in a game must satisfy an "equilibrium concept". All other joint strategies are considered impossible; the only issue is what equilibrium…

We study two-player constant-sum Bayesian games with type-independent payoffs. Under a "completeness" statistical condition, any "identifiable'" equilibrium is an ex-post equilibrium. We apply this result to a Downsian election in which…

Zero-sum games are natural, if informal, analogues of closed physical systems where no energy/utility can enter or exit. This analogy can be extended even further if we consider zero-sum network (polymatrix) games where multiple agents…

This paper is concerned with a two-person zero-sum indefinite stochastic linear-quadratic Stackelberg differential game with asymmetric informational uncertainties, where both the leader and follower face different and unknown disturbances.…

We consider games in which players search for a hidden prize, and they have asymmetric information about the prize location. We study the social payoff in equilibria of these games. We present sufficient conditions for the existence of an…

We study linear-quadratic games of incomplete information with Gaussian uncertainty, where each player's payoff depends on a privately observed type and a common state. The designer observes the state, elicits types, and sells action…

The article introduces a notion of a stochastic game with failure states and proposes two logical systems with modality "coalition has a strategy to transition to a non-failure state with a given probability while achieving a given goal."…

This short note demonstrates how one can define a transformation of a non-zero sum game into a zero sum, so that the optimal mixed strategy achieving equilibrium always exists. The transformation is equivalent to introduction of a passive…

We consider a stochastic game with partial, asymmetric and non-classical information, where the agents are trying to acquire as many available opportunities/locks as possible. Agents have access only to local information, the information…

This paper studies a stochastic dynamic game between two competing teams, each consisting of a network of collaborating agents. Unlike fully cooperative settings, where all agents share a common objective, each team in this game aims to…

We consider zero-sum stochastic games with finite state and action spaces, perfect information, mean payoff criteria, without any irreducibility assumption on the Markov chains associated to strategies (multichain games). The value of such…

The timing of strategic exit is one of the most important but difficult business decisions, especially under competition and uncertainty. Motivated by this problem, we examine a stochastic game of exit in which players are uncertain about…