Related papers: Dealing with imperfect information in Strategy Log…
Quantified CTL (QCTL) is a well-studied temporal logic that extends CTL with quantification over atomic propositions. It has recently come to the fore as a powerful intermediary framework to study logics for strategic reasoning. We extend…
Strategy Logic (SL) is a very expressive logic for specifying and verifying properties of multi-agent systems: in SL, one can quantify over strategies, assign them to agents, and express properties of the resulting plays. Such a powerful…
Large language models (LLMs) have shown success in handling simple games with imperfect information and enabling multi-agent coordination, but their ability to facilitate practical collaboration against other agents in complex, imperfect…
We consider a two-player zero-sum stochastic differential game in which one of the players has a private information on the game. Both players observe each other, so that the non-informed player can try to guess his missing information. Our…
In the practical deployment of machine learning (ML) models, missing data represents a recurring challenge. Missing data is often addressed when training ML models. But missing data also needs to be addressed when deciding predictions and…
As a contribution to the challenge of building game-playing AI systems, we develop and analyse a formal language for representing and reasoning about strategies. Our logical language builds on the existing general Game Description Language…
We study a general class of dynamic multi-agent decision problems with asymmetric information and non-strategic agents, which includes dynamic teams as a special case. When agents are non-strategic, an agent's strategy is known to the other…
Propositional Dynamic Logic or PDL was invented as a logic for reasoning about regular programming constructs. We propose a new perspective on PDL as a multi-agent strategic logic (MASL). This logic for strategic reasoning has group…
In the literature of game theory, the information sets of extensive form games have different interpretations, which may lead to confusions and paradoxical cases. We argue that the problem lies in the mix-up of two interpretations of the…
We define extensions of CTL and TCTL with strategic operators, called Strategic CTL (SCTL) and Strategic TCTL (STCTL), respectively. For each of the above logics we give a synchronous and asynchronous semantics, i.e., STCTL is interpreted…
In strategic classification, agents modify their features, at a cost, to ideally obtain a positive classification from the learner's classifier. The typical response of the learner is to carefully modify their classifier to be robust to…
In open systems verification, to formally check for reliability, one needs an appropriate formalism to model the interaction between agents and express the correctness of the system no matter how the environment behaves. An important…
Bayesian rationality in strategic games presumes that it is possible to translate strategic uncertainty into imperfect information. Correlated equilibrium is guided by the idea that players are Bayes rational, have a common prior, and…
An agent, or a coalition of agents, faces an ethical dilemma between several statements if she is forced to make a conscious choice between which of these statements will be true. This paper proposes to capture ethical dilemmas as a…
In imperfect information games (e.g. Bridge, Skat, Poker), one of the fundamental considerations is to infer the missing information while at the same time avoiding the disclosure of private information. Disregarding the issue of protecting…
This paper formally models the strategic repeated interactions between a system, comprising of a machine learning (ML) model and associated explanation method, and an end-user who is seeking a prediction/label and its explanation for a…
The goal of agents in multi-agent environments is to maximize total reward against the opposing agents that are encountered. Following a game-theoretic solution concept, such as Nash equilibrium, may obtain a strong performance in some…
We develop first-order logic and some extensions for incomplete information scenarios and consider related complexity issues.
Most models of Stackelberg security games assume that the attacker only knows the defender's mixed strategy, but is not able to observe (even partially) the instantiated pure strategy. Such partial observation of the deployed pure strategy…
For zero-sum two-player continuous-time games with integral payoff and incomplete information on one side, one shows that the optimal strategy of the informed player can be computed through an auxiliary optimization problem over some…