Related papers: Dealing with imperfect information in Strategy Log…

Alternating-time temporal logic with strategy contexts (ATLsc) is a powerful formalism for expressing properties of multi-agent systems: it extends CTL with strategy quantifiers, offering a convenient way of expressing both collaboration…

This article is about temporal multi-agent logics. Several of these formalisms have been already presented (ATL-ATL*, ATLsc, SL). They enable to express the capacities of agents in a system to ensure the satisfaction of temporal properties.…

This paper examines strategic trading under incomplete information, where firms lack full knowledge of key aspects of their competitors' trading strategies such as target sizes and market impact models. We extend previous work on…

We study linear-quadratic games of incomplete information with Gaussian uncertainty, where each player's payoff depends on a privately observed type and a common state. The designer observes the state, elicits types, and sells action…

Zero-sum asymmetric games model decision making scenarios involving two competing players who have different information about the game being played. A particular case is that of nested information, where one (informed) player has superior…

We study the optimal use of information in Markov games with incomplete information on one side and two states. We provide a finite-stage algorithm for calculating the limit value as the gap between stages goes to 0, and an optimal strategy…

Quite some work in the ATL-tradition uses the differences between various types of strategies (positional, uniform, perfect recall) to give alternative semantics to the same logical language. This paper contributes to another perspective on…

Strategic reasoning enables agents to cooperate, communicate, and compete with other agents in diverse situations. Existing approaches to solving strategic games rely on extensive training, yielding strategies that do not generalize to new…

We study a general class of dynamic games with asymmetric information where agents' beliefs are strategy dependent, i.e. signaling occurs. We show that the notion of sufficient information, introduced in the companion paper team, can be…

We consider a game-theoretic setting to model the interplay between attacker and defender in the context of information flow, and to reason about their optimal strategies. In contrast with standard game theory, in our games the utility of a…

We study a model of games that combines concurrency, imperfect information and stochastic aspects. Those are finite states games in which, at each round, the two players choose, simultaneously and independently, an action. Then a successor…

The paper presents an extension of temporal epistemic logic with operators that quantify over strategies. The language also provides a natural way to represent what agents would know were they to be aware of the strategies being used by…

Traditionally, Epistemic Logic represents epistemic scenarios using a single model. This, however, covers only complete descriptions that specify truth values of all assertions. Indeed, many -- and perhaps most -- epistemic descriptions are…

Blameworthiness of an agent or a coalition of agents is often defined in terms of the principle of alternative possibilities: for the coalition to be responsible for an outcome, the outcome must take place and the coalition should have had…

We consider imperfect information stochastic games where we require the players to use pure (i.e. non randomised) strategies. We consider reachability, safety, B\"uchi and co-B\"uchi objectives, and investigate the existence of…

In this paper, we present a conceptual model game to examine the dynamics of asymmetric interactions in games with imperfect information. The game involves two agents with starkly contrasting capabilities: one agent can take actions but has…

The present work aims to give a unity of logic via standard sequential, unpolarized games. Specifically, our vision is that there must be mathematically precise concepts of linear refinement and intuitionistic restriction of logic such that…

The article considers strategies of coalitions that are based on intelligence information about moves of some of the other agents. The main technical result is a sound and complete logical system that describes the interplay between…

Alternating-time Temporal Logic (ATL*) is a central logic for multiagent systems. Its extension to the imperfect information setting (ATL*i ) is well known to have an undecidable model-checking problem when agents have perfect recall.…

In imperfect-information games, the optimal strategy in a subgame may depend on the strategy in other, unreached subgames. Thus a subgame cannot be solved in isolation and must instead consider the strategy for the entire game as a whole,…