Related papers: Empirical strategy-proofness
Contrary to the customary view that the celebrated Nash-equilibrium theorem in Game Theory is paradigmatic for non-cooperative games, it is shown that, in fact, it is essentially based on a particularly strong cooperation assumption.…
Conventional game theory assumes that players are perfectly rational. In a realistic situation, however, players are rarely perfectly rational. This bounded rationality is one of the main reasons why the predictions of Nash equilibrium in…
Evidence suggests that participants in strategy-proof matching mechanisms play dominated strategies. To explain the data, we introduce expectation-based loss aversion into a school-choice setting and characterize choice-acclimating personal…
Many important real-world settings contain multiple players interacting over an unknown duration with probabilistic state transitions, and are naturally modeled as stochastic games. Prior research on algorithms for stochastic games has…
Many multiagent systems rely on collective decision-making among self-interested agents, which raises deep questions about coalition formation and stability. We study social choice with endogenous, outcome-contingent transfers, where agents…
We introduce a set-valued solution concept, M equilibrium, to capture empirical regularities from over half a century of game-theory experiments. We show M equilibrium serves as a meta theory for various models that hitherto were considered…
This paper investigates the privacy-preserving distributed Nash equilibrium seeking problem for aggregative games. A novel differential privacy mechanism is designed by incorporating stochastic event-triggering with stochastic quantization,…
In many cases the Nash equilibria are not predictive of the experimental players' behaviour. For some games of Game Theory it is proposed here a method to estimate the probabilities with which the different options will be actually chosen…
In this paper, Nash equilibrium seeking among a network of players is considered. Different from many existing works on Nash equilibrium seeking in non-cooperative games, the players considered in this paper cannot directly observe the…
We study organizational elections in which each group nominates one candidate and receives as payoff its members expected utility under a probabilistic winning rule. We empirically justify a standard monotonicity assumption by simulating…
Games with incomplete preferences are an important model for studying rational decision-making in scenarios where players face incomplete information about their preferences and must contend with incomparable outcomes. We study the problem…
To verify the robustness of a program or protocol, it is common in the computer science community to rely on the theoretical framework of game theory. In particular, if one seeks to enforce a desired property, or specification, despite an…
The preferences of players in non-cooperative games represent their choice in the set of available options, which meet the completeness property if players are able to compare any pair of available options. In the existing literature, the…
Distributed Nash equilibrium seeking of aggregative games is investigated and a continuous-time algorithm is proposed. The algorithm is designed by virtue of projected gradient play dynamics and distributed average tracking dynamics, and is…
In their seminal work, Nayyar et al. (2013) showed that imperfect information can be abstracted away from common-payoff games by having players publicly announce their policies as they play. This insight underpins sound solvers and…
Deception plays a critical role in many interactions in communication and network security. Game-theoretic models called "cheap talk signaling games" capture the dynamic and information asymmetric nature of deceptive interactions. But…
We consider a game-theoretic setting to model the interplay between attacker and defender in the context of information flow, and to reason about their optimal strategies. In contrast with standard game theory, in our games the utility of a…
In this paper, we address the challenge of Nash equilibrium (NE) seeking in non-cooperative convex games with partial-decision information. We propose a distributed algorithm, where each agent refines its strategy through projected-gradient…
In this work, we study the system of interacting non-cooperative two Q-learning agents, where one agent has the privilege of observing the other's actions. We show that this information asymmetry can lead to a stable outcome of population…
This paper considers coverage games in which a group of agents are tasked with identifying the highest-value subset of resources; in this context, game-theoretic approaches are known to yield Nash equilibria within a factor of 2 of optimal.…