Related papers: Empirical strategy-proofness
The Nash equilibrium problem is a widely used tool to model non-cooperative games. Many solution methods have been proposed in the literature to compute solutions of Nash equilibrium problems with continuous strategy sets, but, besides some…
Nash equilibrium is a popular solution concept for solving imperfect-information games in practice. However, it has a major drawback: it does not preclude suboptimal play in branches of the game tree that are not reached in equilibrium.…
An extensive literature in economics and social science addresses contests, in which players compete to outperform each other on some measurable criterion, often referred to as a player's score, or output. Players incur costs that are an…
Consider an important meeting to be held in a team-based organization. Taking availability constraints into account, an online scheduling poll is being used in order to decide upon the exact time of the meeting. Decisions are to be taken…
A significant aspect of the study of quantum strategies is the exploration of the game-theoretic solution concept of the Nash equilibrium in relation to the quantization of a game. Pareto optimality is a refinement on the set of Nash…
This paper proposes a novel approach for locally stable convergence to Nash equilibrium in duopoly noncooperative games based on a distributed event-triggered control scheme. The proposed approach employs extremum seeking, with sinusoidal…
We extend the study of learning in games to dynamics that exhibit non-asymptotic stability. We do so through the notion of uniform stability, which is concerned with equilibria of individually utility-seeking dynamics. Perhaps surprisingly,…
We address the problem of assessing the robustness of the equilibria in uncertain, multi-agent games. Specifically, we focus on generalized Nash equilibrium problems in aggregative form subject to linear coupling constraints affected by…
Coordination is a desirable feature in multi-agent systems, allowing the execution of tasks that would be impossible by individual agents. We study coordination by a team of strategic agents choosing to undertake one of the multiple tasks.…
We study stochastic Nash equilibrium problems subject to heterogeneous uncertainty on the expected valued cost functions of the individual agents, where we assume no prior knowledge of the underlying probability distributions of the…
The computational study of equilibria involving constraints on players' strategies has been largely neglected. However, in real-world applications, players are usually subject to constraints ruling out the feasibility of some of their…
We address the question of whether price of stability results (existence of equilibria with low social cost) are robust to incomplete information. We show that this is the case in potential games, if the underlying algorithmic social cost…
In many real-world settings agents engage in strategic interactions with multiple opposing agents who can employ a wide variety of strategies. The standard approach for designing agents for such settings is to compute or approximate a…
Strategyproof mechanisms provide robust equilibrium with minimal assumptions about knowledge and rationality but can be unachievable in combination with other desirable properties such as budget-balance, stability against deviations by…
This paper proposes a novel approach for local convergence to Nash equilibrium in quadratic noncooperative games based on a distributed Lie-bracket extremum seeking control scheme. This is the first instance of noncooperative games being…
The distributed computation of a Nash equilibrium in aggregative games is gaining increased traction in recent years. Of particular interest is the mediator-free scenario where individual players only access or observe the decisions of…
Examining the behavior of multi-agent systems is vitally important to many emerging distributed applications - game theory has emerged as a powerful tool set in which to do so. The main approach of game-theoretic techniques is to model…
The empirical success of Multi-agent reinforcement learning is encouraging, while few theoretical guarantees have been revealed. In this work, we prove that the plug-in solver approach, probably the most natural reinforcement learning…
We consider for the first time a stochastic generalized Nash equilibrium problem, i.e., with expected-value cost functions and joint feasibility constraints, under partial-decision information, meaning that the agents communicate only with…
In response to a change, individuals may choose to follow the responses of their friends or, alternatively, to change their friends. To model these decisions, consider a game where players choose their behaviors and friendships. In…