Related papers: Empirical strategy-proofness
In this paper we study the implementation challenge in an abstract interdependent values model and an arbitrary objective function. We design a mechanism that allows for approximate optimal implementation of insensitive objective functions…
We consider the provision of public goods on networks of strategic agents. We study different effort outcomes of these network games, namely, the Nash equilibria, Pareto efficient effort profiles, and semi-cooperative equilibria (effort…
Game theory is a very profound study on distributed decision-making behavior and has been extensively developed by many scholars. However, many existing works rely on certain strict assumptions such as knowing the opponent's private…
There has been substantial progress on finding game-theoretic equilibria. Most of that work has focused on games with finite, discrete action spaces. However, many games involving space, time, money, and other fine-grained quantities have…
In many game-theoretic settings, agents are challenged with taking decisions against the uncertain behavior exhibited by others. Often, this uncertainty arises from multiple sources, e.g., incomplete information, limited computation,…
We study the problem of computing an $\epsilon$-Nash equilibrium in repeated games. Earlier work by Borgs et al. [2010] suggests that this problem is intractable. We show that if we make a slight change to their model---modeling the players…
This paper introduces an equilibrium framework based on sequential sampling in which players face strategic uncertainty over their opponents' behavior and acquire informative signals to resolve it. Sequential sampling equilibrium delivers a…
A growing body of literature in networked systems research relies on game theory and mechanism design to model and address the potential lack of cooperation between self-interested users. Most game-theoretic models applied to system…
As autonomous AI agents increasingly mediate online platform markets, a fundamental question emerges: do these markets generate stable strategic outcomes? In repeated strategic environments, the Nash equilibrium provides a natural benchmark…
Correlated equilibria arise naturally when agents communicate or rely on intermediaries such as recommendation systems. We study when a given Nash equilibrium can be improved within the set of correlated equilibria for general objectives.…
We study a strategic experimentation game with exponential bandits, in which experiment outcomes are private. The equilibrium amount of experimentation is always higher than in the benchmark case where experiment outcomes are publicly…
LLM agents are known to deviate from Nash equilibria in strategic interactions, but nobody has looked inside the model to understand why, or asked whether the deviation can be reversed. We do both. Working with four open-source models…
This paper provides theoretical bounds for empirical game theoretical analysis of complex multi-agent interactions. We provide insights in the empirical meta game showing that a Nash equilibrium of the meta-game is an approximate Nash…
In a strategic form game a strategy profile is an equilibrium if no viable coalition of agents (or players) benefits (in the Pareto sense) from jointly changing their strategies. Weaker or stronger equilibrium notions can be defined by…
In this paper, we introduce a preliminary model for interactions in the data market. Recent research has shown ways in which a data aggregator can design mechanisms for users to ensure the quality of data, even in situations where the users…
We suggest a novel stochastic-approximation algorithm to compute a symmetric Nash-equilibrium strategy in a general queueing game with a finite action space. The algorithm involves a single simulation of the queueing process with dynamic…
We present a strategy-proof public goods budgeting mechanism where agents determine both the total volume of expanses and the specific allocation. It is constructed as a modification of VCG to a less typical environment, namely where we do…
Game-theoretic techniques and equilibria analysis facilitate the design and verification of competitive systems. While algorithmic complexity of equilibria computation has been extensively studied, practical implementation and application…
An equilibrium is communication-proof if it is unaffected by new opportunities to communicate and renegotiate. We characterize the set of equilibria of coordination games with pre-play communication in which players have private preferences…
We characterize Nash equilibrium by postulating coherent behavior across varying games. Nash equilibrium is the only solution concept that satisfies the following axioms: (i) strictly dominant actions are played with positive probability,…