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A framework is presented for fitting inverse problem models via variational Bayes approximations. This methodology guarantees flexibility to statistical model specification for a broad range of applications, good accuracy and reduced model…

In this paper, we investigate the power of {\it regularization}, a common technique in reinforcement learning and optimization, in solving extensive-form games (EFGs). We propose a series of new algorithms based on regularizing the payoff…

Classification models for electroencephalogram (EEG) data show a large decrease in performance when evaluated on unseen test sub jects. We reduce this performance decrease using new regularization techniques during model training. We…

In this paper, we delve into the utilization of the negative momentum technique in constrained minimax games. From an intuitive mechanical standpoint, we introduce a novel framework for momentum buffer updating, which extends the findings…

Counterfactual Regret Minimization (CFR) and its variants are widely recognized as effective algorithms for solving extensive-form imperfect information games. Recently, many improvements have been focused on enhancing the convergence speed…

Designing efficient algorithms to find Nash equilibrium (NE) refinements in sequential games is of paramount importance in practice. Indeed, it is well known that the NE has several weaknesses, since it may prescribe to play sub-optimal…

We present a simulation-based approach for solution of mean field games (MFGs), using the framework of empirical game-theoretical analysis (EGTA). Our primary method employs a version of the double oracle, iteratively adding strategies…

Mean field game (MFG) is an expressive modeling framework for systems with a continuum of interacting agents. While many approaches exist for solving the forward MFG, few have studied its \textit{inverse} problem. In this work, we seek to…

We study the performance of optimistic regret-minimization algorithms for both minimizing regret in, and computing Nash equilibria of, zero-sum extensive-form games. In order to apply these algorithms to extensive-form games, a…

Counterfactual Regret Minimization (CFR) is the leading framework for solving large imperfect-information games. It converges to an equilibrium by iteratively traversing the game tree. In order to deal with extremely large games,…

We study online learning and equilibrium computation in games with polyhedral decision sets, a property shared by both normal-form games and extensive-form games (EFGs), when the learning agent is restricted to using a best-response oracle.…

If the influence diagram (ID) depicting a Bayesian game is common knowledge to its players then additional assumptions may allow the players to make use of its embodied irrelevance statements. They can then use these to discover a simpler…

With origins in game theory, probabilistic values like Shapley values, Banzhaf values, and semi-values have emerged as a central tool in explainable AI. They are used for feature attribution, data attribution, data valuation, and more.…

Sequential decision problems are often approximately solvable by simulating possible future action sequences. Metalevel decision procedures have been developed for selecting which action sequences to simulate, based on estimating the…

Hypothesis testing via e-variables can be framed as a sequential betting game, where a player each round picks an e-variable. A good player's strategy results in an effective statistical test that rejects the null hypothesis as soon as…

Counterfactual regret minimization (CFR) is a family of iterative algorithms that are the most popular and, in practice, fastest approach to approximately solving large imperfect-information games. In this paper we introduce novel CFR…

Sequential decision problems are often approximately solvable by simulating possible future action sequences. {\em Metalevel} decision procedures have been developed for selecting {\em which} action sequences to simulate, based on…

A dominant approach to solving large imperfect-information games is Counterfactural Regret Minimization (CFR). In CFR, many regret minimization problems are combined to solve the game. For very large games, abstraction is typically needed…

Regret minimization is a powerful method for finding Nash equilibria in Normal-Form Games (NFGs) and Extensive-Form Games (EFGs), but it typically guarantees convergence only for the average strategy. However, computing the average strategy…

Regret minimization is a powerful tool for solving large-scale extensive-form games. State-of-the-art methods rely on minimizing regret locally at each decision point. In this work we derive a new framework for regret minimization on…