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We propose a general framework for strategic voting when a voter may lack knowledge about other votes or about other voters' knowledge about her own vote. In this setting we define notions of manipulation and equilibrium. We also model…

Computer Science and Game Theory · Computer Science 2013-10-28 Hans van Ditmarsch , Jerome Lang , Abdallah Saffidine

We propose a framework for strategic voting when a voter may lack knowledge about the preferences of other voters, or about other voters' knowledge about her own preference. In this setting we define notions of manipulation, equilibrium,…

Computer Science and Game Theory · Computer Science 2021-11-30 Zeinab Bakhtiari , Hans van Ditmarsch , Abdallah Saffidine

The question of how people vote strategically under uncertainty has attracted much attention in several disciplines. Theoretical decision models have been proposed which vary in their assumptions on the sophistication of the voters and on…

Computer Science and Game Theory · Computer Science 2018-05-22 Roy Fairstein , Adam Lauz , Kobi Gal , Reshef Meir

We present a new strategic voting model where we use uncertainty representation to model preferences. Specifically, we use probability sets as uncertainty representations, together with lower and upper expected utility gains to take…

Computer Science and Game Theory · Computer Science 2026-05-18 Henri Surugue , Sébastien Destercke

Strategic voting, or manipulation, is the process by which a voter misrepresents his preferences in an attempt to elect an outcome that he considers preferable to the outcome under sincere voting. It is generally agreed that manipulation is…

Computer Science and Game Theory · Computer Science 2022-11-10 Egor Ianovski , Daria Teplova , Valeriia Kuka

There are many situations in which mis-coordinated strategic voting can leave strategic voters worse off than they would have been had they not tried to strategize. We analyse the simplest of such scenarios, in which the set of strategic…

Computer Science and Game Theory · Computer Science 2013-01-09 Arkadii Slinko , Shaun White

We study the voting game where agents' preferences are endogenously decided by the information they receive, and they can collaborate in a group. We show that strategic voting behaviors have a positive impact on leading to the ``correct''…

Computer Science and Game Theory · Computer Science 2023-05-23 Qishen Han , Grant Schoenebeck , Biaoshuai Tao , Lirong Xia

A voting center is in charge of collecting and aggregating voter preferences. In an iterative process, the center sends comparison queries to voters, requesting them to submit their preference between two items. Voters might discuss the…

Computers and Society · Computer Science 2019-09-24 Lihi Dery , Svetlana Obraztsova , Zinovi Rabinovich , Meir Kalech

Integrity of elections is vital to democratic systems, but it is frequently threatened by malicious actors. The study of algorithmic complexity of the problem of manipulating election outcomes by changing its structural features is known as…

Computer Science and Game Theory · Computer Science 2020-07-21 Andrew Estornell , Sanmay Das , Edith Elkind , Yevgeniy Vorobeychik

It is important to study how strategic agents can affect the outcome of an election. There has been a long line of research in the computational study of elections on the complexity of manipulative actions such as manipulation and bribery.…

Computer Science and Game Theory · Computer Science 2023-07-24 Zack Fitzsimmons , Edith Hemaspaandra

Coalitional manipulation in voting is considered to be any scenario in which a group of voters decide to misrepresent their vote in order to secure an outcome they all prefer to the first outcome of the election when they vote honestly. The…

Theoretical Economics · Economics 2020-09-28 Mostapha Diss , Boris Tsvelikhovskiy

Decision making under uncertainty is a key component of many AI settings, and in particular of voting scenarios where strategic agents are trying to reach a joint decision. The common approach to handle uncertainty is by maximizing expected…

Computer Science and Game Theory · Computer Science 2018-11-15 Omer Lev , Reshef Meir , Svetlana Obraztsova , Maria Polukarov

By the Gibbard--Satterthwaite theorem, every reasonable voting rule for three or more alternatives is susceptible to manipulation: there exist elections where one or more voters can change the election outcome in their favour by…

Computer Science and Game Theory · Computer Science 2017-07-28 Edith Elkind , Umberto Grandi , Francesca Rossi , Arkadii Slinko

Understanding the nature of strategic voting is the holy grail of social choice theory, where game-theory, social science and recently computational approaches are all applied in order to model the incentives and behavior of voters. In a…

Multiagent Systems · Computer Science 2014-11-19 Reshef Meir

A negotiating team is a group of two or more agents who join together as a single negotiating party because they share a common goal related to the negotiation. Since a negotiating team is composed of several stakeholders, represented as a…

Computer Science and Game Theory · Computer Science 2021-08-03 Leora Schmerler , Noam Hazon

It is well known that no reasonable voting rule is strategyproof. Moreover, the common Plurality rule is particularly prone to strategic behavior of the voters and empirical studies show that people often vote strategically in practice.…

Computer Science and Game Theory · Computer Science 2014-04-22 Reshef Meir , Omer Lev , Jeffrey S. Rosenschein

In many collective decision making situations, agents vote to choose an alternative that best represents the preferences of the group. Agents may manipulate the vote to achieve a better outcome by voting in a way that does not reflect their…

Computer Science and Game Theory · Computer Science 2019-12-03 Jaelle Scheuerman , Jason L. Harman , Nicholas Mattei , K. Brent Venable

The probability of a given candidate winning a future election is worked out in closed form as a function of (i) the current support rates for each candidate, (ii) the relative positioning of the candidates within the political spectrum,…

Probability · Mathematics 2025-04-25 Dorje C. Brody , Tomooki Yuasa

Despite the prevalence of voting systems in the real world there is no consensus among researchers of how people vote strategically, even in simple voting settings. This paper addresses this gap by comparing different approaches that have…

Computer Science and Game Theory · Computer Science 2019-09-24 Roy Fairstein , Adam Lauz , Kobi Gal , Reshef Meir

The integrity of elections is central to democratic systems. However, a myriad of malicious actors aspire to influence election outcomes for financial or political benefit. A common means to such ends is by manipulating perceptions of the…

Computer Science and Game Theory · Computer Science 2022-06-22 Junlin Wu , Andrew Estornell , Lecheng Kong , Yevgeniy Vorobeychik
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