Related papers: Strategyproof Mechanism for Two Heterogeneous Faci…

We consider the problem of locating a single facility on the real line. This facility serves a set of agents, each of whom is located on the line, and incurs a cost equal to his distance from the facility. An agent's location is private…

We study the mechanism design problem of facility location on a metric space in the learning-augmented framework, where mechanisms have access to imperfect predictions of the optimal facility locations. Our objective is to design…

We consider a truthful facility location problem with agents that have private positions on the line of real numbers and known optional preferences over two obnoxious facilities that must be placed at locations chosen from a given set of…

In this paper, we study mechanism design for single-facility location games where each agent has multiple private locations in [0, 1]. The individual objective is a satisfaction function that measures the discrepancy between the optimal…

We study a constrained distributed heterogeneous two-facility location problem, where a set of agents with private locations on the real line are divided into disjoint groups. The constraint means that the facilities can only be built in a…

We study the problem of locating a single obnoxious facility on the normalized line segment $[0,1]$ with strategic agents from a mechanism design perspective. Each agent has a preference for the undesirable location of the facility and…

This paper is devoted to the two-opposite-facility location games with a penalty whose amount depends on the distance between the two facilities to be opened by an authority. The two facilities are "opposite" in that one is popular and the…

In a facility game one or more facilities are placed in a metric space to serve a set of selfish agents whose addresses are their private information. In a classical facility game, each agent wants to be as close to a facility as possible,…

We consider the obnoxious facility location problem (in which agents prefer the facility location to be far from them) and propose a hierarchy of distance-based proportional fairness concepts for the problem. These fairness axioms ensure…

We consider the strategyproof facility location problem on a circle. We focus on the case of 5 agents, and find a tight bound for the PCD strategyproof mechanism, which selects the reported location of an agent in proportion to the length…

We study the facility location problems where agents are located on a real line and divided into groups based on criteria such as ethnicity or age. Our aim is to design mechanisms to locate a facility to approximately minimize the costs of…

Facility location problems often permit facilities to be located at any position. But what if this is not the case in practice? What if facilities can only be located at particular locations like a highway exit or close to a bus stop? We…

We study a distributed facility location problem in which a set of agents, each with a private position on the real line, is partitioned into a collection of fixed, disjoint groups. The goal is to open $k$ facilities at locations chosen…

We study the problem of locating a single facility on a real line based on the reports of self-interested agents, when agents have double-peaked preferences, with the peaks being on opposite sides of their locations. We observe that…

We consider the problem of locating a single facility for 2 agents in $L_p$ space ($1<p<\infty$) and give a nearly complete characterization of such deterministic strategyproof mechanisms. We use the distance between an agent and the…

We study the distributed facility location games with candidate locations, where agents on a line are partitioned into groups. Both desirable and obnoxious facility location settings are discussed. In distributed location problems,…

We consider the facility location problem in the one-dimensional setting where each facility can serve a limited number of agents from the algorithmic and mechanism design perspectives. From the algorithmic perspective, we prove that the…

The facility location game has been studied extensively in mechanism design. In the classical model, each agent's cost is solely determined by her distance to the nearest facility. In this paper, we introduce a novel model where each…

We initiate the study of the heterogeneous facility location problem with limited resources. We mainly focus on the fundamental case where a set of agents are positioned in the line segment [0,1] and have approval preferences over two…

We consider the facility location problem in two dimensions. In particular, we consider a setting where agents have Euclidean preferences, defined by their ideal points, for a facility to be located in $\mathbb{R}^2$. We show that for the…