Related papers: Contract Design with Costly Convex Self-Control
The aggregation of conflicting preferences is a central problem in multiagent systems. The key difficulty is that the agents may report their preferences insincerely. Mechanism design is the art of designing the rules of the game so that…
Pricing decisions are often made when market information is still poor. In turn, existing theoretical models often reason about the response of optimal prices to changing market characteristics without exploiting all available information…
We analyze digital markets where a monopolist platform uses data to match multiproduct sellers with heterogeneous consumers who can purchase both on and off the platform. The platform sells targeted ads to sellers that recommend their…
Task allocation is a crucial process in modern systems, but it is often challenged by incomplete information about the utilities of participating agents. In this paper, we propose a new profit maximization mechanism for the task allocation…
We consider the problem of finite-horizon optimal control design under uncertainty for imperfectly observed discrete-time systems with convex costs and constraints. It is known that this problem can be cast as an infinite-dimensional convex…
This paper investigates third-degree price discrimination under endogenous market segmentation. Segmenting a market requires access to information about consumers, and this information comes with a cost. I explore the trade-offs between the…
We consider a feature-based personalized pricing problem in which the buyer is strategic: given the seller's pricing policy, the buyer can augment the features that they reveal to the seller to obtain a low price for the product. We model…
We study mechanisms for selling a single item when buyers have private costs for participating in the mechanism. An agent's participation cost can also be interpreted as an outside option value that she must forego to participate. This…
This paper studies a finite-fuel two-dimensional degenerate singular stochastic control problem under regime switching that is motivated by the optimal irreversible extraction problem of an exhaustible commodity. A company extracts a…
We analyze a cost-minimization problem in which the controller relies on an imperfect timeseries forecast. Forecasting models generate imperfect forecasts because they use anonymization noise to protect input data privacy. However, this…
Dynamic pricing is commonly used to regulate congestion in shared service systems. This paper is motivated by the fact that in the presence of users with varying price sensitivity (responsiveness), conventional monotonic pricing can lead to…
Motivated by Germany's April 2026 fuel price regulation, in this note I study a two-period pricing problem with demand uncertainty and a rule that prohibits more than one price increase during the day. Under flexible pricing, the firm…
We study multi-product monopoly pricing where the seller jointly designs the selling mechanism and the information structure for the buyer to learn his values. Unlike the case with exogenous information, we show that when the seller…
We introduce pricing formulas for competition and collusion models of two-sided markets with an outside option. For the competition model, we find conditions under which prices and consumer surplus may increase or decrease if the outside…
In this paper, the optimal pricing strategy in Avellande-Stoikov's for a monopolistic dealer is extended to a general situation where multiple dealers are present in a competitive market. The dealers' trading intensities, their optimal bid…
We consider optimization problems with manifold-valued constraints. These generalize classical equality and inequality constraints to a setting in which both the domain and the codomain of the constraint mapping are smooth manifolds. We…
We study the effects of allowing paid prioritization arrangements in a market with content provider (CP) competition. We consider competing CPs who pay prioritization fees to a monopolistic ISP so as to offset the ISP's cost for investing…
Linear contracts are ubiquitous in practice, yet optimal contract theory often prescribes complex, nonlinear structures. We provide a distributional robustness justification for linear contracts. We study a principal-agent problem where the…
We consider the optimal pricing problem for a model of the rich media advertisement market, as well as other related applications. In this market, there are multiple buyers (advertisers), and items (slots) that are arranged in a line such…
Chance constraints are a valuable tool for the design of safe decisions in uncertain environments; they are used to model satisfaction of a constraint with a target probability. However, because of possible non-convexity and non-smoothness,…