Related papers: Convergence and Hardness of Strategic Schelling Se…
We consider the constrained Schelling model of social segregation in which the utility factor of agents strictly increases and non-local jumps of the agents are allowed. In the present study, the utility factor u is defined in a way such…
In this paper, we propose a distributed algorithm, called Directed-Distributed Gradient Descent (D-DGD), to solve multi-agent optimization problems over directed graphs. Existing algorithms mostly deal with similar problems under the…
The similarities between phase separation in physics and residential segregation by preference in the Schelling model of 1971 are reviewed. Also, new computer simulations of asymmetric interactions different from the usual Ising model are…
Self-stabilization is an excellent approach for adding fault tolerance to a distributed multi-agent system. However, two properties of self-stabilization theory, convergence and closure, may not be satisfied if agents are selfish. To…
Competition for a limited resource is the hallmark of many complex systems, and often, that resource turns out to be the physical space itself. In this work, we study a novel model designed to elucidate the dynamics and emergence in complex…
The classical house allocation problem involves assigning $n$ houses (or items) to $n$ agents according to their preferences. A key criterion in such problems is satisfying some fairness constraints such as envy-freeness. We consider a…
We study the problem of allocating indivisible objects to a set of rational agents where each agent's final utility depends on the intrinsic valuation of the allocated item as well as the allocation within the agent's local neighbourhood.…
We study a model of competition among nomadic agents for time-varying and location-specific resources, arising in crowd-sourced transportation services, online communities, and traditional location-based economic activity. This model…
We introduce a class of strategic games in which agents are assigned to nodes of a topology graph and the utility of an agent depends on both the agent's inherent utilities for other agents as well as her distance from these agents on the…
We consider a Schelling-like segregation model, in which the behavior of individual agents is determined by a mixed individual and global utility. With a high ratio of global utility being incorporated, the agents are cooperative in order…
In the Seat Arrangement problem the goal is to allocate agents to vertices in a graph such that the resulting arrangement is optimal or fair in some way. Examples include an arrangement that maximises utility or one where no agent envies…
We focus on the problem of sequential decision making in partially observable environments shared with other agents of uncertain types having similar or conflicting objectives. This problem has been previously formalized by multiple…
The Schelling model, introduced by Schelling in 1969 as a model for residential segregation in cities, describes how populations of multiple types self-organize to form homogeneous clusters of one type. In this model, vertices in an…
Distributed learning is essential to train machine learning algorithms across heterogeneous agents while maintaining data privacy. We conduct an asymptotic analysis of Unified Distributed SGD (UD-SGD), exploring a variety of communication…
A two-player game-theoretic problem on resilient graphs in a multiagent consensus setting is formulated. An attacker is capable to disable some of the edges of the network with the objective to divide the agents into clusters by emitting…
We study heterogeneous $k$-facility location games. In this model there are $k$ facilities where each facility serves a different purpose. Thus, the preferences of the agents over the facilities can vary arbitrarily. Our goal is to design…
We consider a model of nomadic agents exploring and competing for time-varying location-specific resources, arising in crowdsourced transportation services, online communities, and in traditional location based economic activity. This model…
We study a game between liquidity provider and liquidity taker agents interacting in an over-the-counter market, for which the typical example is foreign exchange. We show how a suitable design of parameterized families of reward functions…
Axelrod's model for the dissemination of culture combines two key ingredients of social dynamics: social influence, through which people become more similar when they interact, and homophily, which is the tendency of individuals to interact…
In this paper, we consider game problems played by (multi)-integrator agents, subject to external disturbances. We propose Nash equilibrium seeking dynamics based on gradient-play, augmented with a dynamic internal-model based component,…