Related papers: Convergence and Hardness of Strategic Schelling Se…
We consider an agent-based model in which two types of agents interact locally over a graph and have a common intolerance threshold $\tau$ for changing their types with exponentially distributed waiting times. The model is equivalent to an…
The Schelling model of segregation looks to explain the way in which a population of agents or particles of two types may come to organise itself into large homogeneous clusters, and can be seen as a variant of the Ising model in which the…
Since the development of the original Schelling model of urban segregation, several enhancements have been proposed, but none have considered the impact of mobility constraints on model dynamics. Recent studies have shown that human…
Schelling games use a game-theoretic approach to study the phenomenon of residential segregation as originally modeled by Schelling. Inspired by the recent increase in the number of people and businesses preferring and promoting diversity,…
We investigate the dependence of steady-state properties of Schelling's segregation model on the agents' activation order. Our basic formalism is the Pollicott-Weiss version of Schelling's segregation model. Our main result modifies this…
This study employs gamified experiments to investigate and refine the Schelling Model of Segregation, a framework that demonstrates how individual preferences can lead to systemic segregation. Using a movement selection algorithm derived…
Residential segregation is analyzed via the Schelling model, in which two types of agents attempt to optimize their situation according to certain preferences and tolerance levels. Several variants of this work are focused on urban or…
We model the dynamics of the Schelling model for agents described simply by a continuously distributed variable - wealth. Agents move to neighborhoods where their wealth is not lesser than that of some proportion of their neighbors, the…
In Schelling's segregation model agents of two ethnic groups reside in a regular grid and aim to live in a neighborhood that matches the minimum desired fraction of members of the same ethnicity. The model shows that observed segregation…
We analyze the Schelling model of segregation in which a society of n individuals live in a ring. Each individual is one of two races and is only satisfied with his location so long as at least half his 2w nearest neighbors are of the same…
We explore extensions of Schelling's model of social dynamics, in which two types of agents live on a checkerboard lattice and move in order to optimize their own satisfaction, which depends on how many agents among their neighbors are of…
Agent-based models of residential segregation have been of persistent interest to various research communities since their origin with James Sakoda and popularization by Thomas Schelling. Frequently, these models have sought to elucidate…
Contrary to the widely believed hypothesis that larger, denser cities promote socioeconomic mixing, a recent study (Nilforoshan et al. 2023) reports the opposite behavior, i.e. more segregation. Here, we present a game-theoretic model that…
Schelling's model is an influential model that reveals how individual perceptions and incentives can lead to residential segregation. Inspired by a recent stream of work, we study welfare guarantees and complexity in this model with respect…
Thomas Schelling developed an influential demographic model that illustrated how, even with relatively mild assumptions on each individual's nearest neighbor preferences, an integrated city would likely unravel to a segregated city, even if…
A version of the Schelling model on $\mathbb{Z}$ is defined, where two types of agents are allocated on the sites. An agent prefers to be surrounded by other agents of its own type, and may choose to move if this is not the case. It then…
We derived the critical neighborhood demand in the Schelling's segregation model by studying the conditions for which a chain reaction of migrations of unsatisfied agents occurs. The essence of Schelling dynamics was approximated in two…
In his 1971's Dynamic Models of Segregation paper, the economist Thomas C. Schelling showed that a small preference for one's neighbors to be of the same color could lead to total segregation, even if total segregation does not correspond…
An aspatial version for the famous Schelling's segregation model has recently been proposed, which, called two-room model, is still in an agent-based format like the original Schelling model. In the present study, we propose a new, state…
Schelling's model of segregation demonstrates that even in the absence of social or governmental interventions, individuals with mild in-group preferences can self-organize into strongly segregated neighborhoods. Many variants of this…