Related papers: Approximately Stable Matchings with General Constr…
The success of Constraint Programming relies partly on the global constraints and implementation of the associated filtering algorithms. Recently, new ideas emerged to improve these implementations in practice, especially regarding the all…
In the multidimensional stable roommate problem, agents have to be allocated to rooms and have preferences over sets of potential roommates. We study the complexity of finding good allocations of agents to rooms under the assumption that…
In two-sided matching markets with contracts, quantile (or generalized median) stable mechanisms represent an interesting class that produces stable allocations which can be viewed as compromises between both sides of the market. These…
The Student-Project Allocation problem with lecturer preferences over Students (SPA-S) involves assigning students to projects based on student preferences over projects, lecturer preferences over students, and the maximum number of…
Bin covering is a dual version of classic bin packing. Thus, the goal is to cover as many bins as possible, where covering a bin means packing items of total size at least one in the bin. For online bin covering, competitive analysis fails…
This paper links matching markets with aligned preferences to optimal transport theory. We show that stability, efficiency, and fairness emerge as solutions to a parametric family of optimal transport problems. The parameter reflects…
This paper introduces a unified framework for stable matching, which nests the traditional definition of stable matching in finite markets and the continuum definition of stable matching from Azevedo and Leshno (2016) as special cases.…
We consider popular matching problems in both bipartite and non-bipartite graphs with strict preference lists. It is known that every stable matching is a min-size popular matching. A subclass of max-size popular matchings called dominant…
In this paper, we generalize the recently studied Stochastic Matching problem to more accurately model a significant medical process, kidney exchange, and several other applications. Up until now the Stochastic Matching problem that has…
The stable allocation problem is a many-to-many generalization of the well-known stable marriage problem, where we seek a bipartite assignment between, say, jobs (of varying sizes) and machines (of varying capacities) that is "stable" based…
Matching problems with group-fairness constraints and diversity constraints have numerous applications such as in allocation problems, committee selection, school choice, etc. Moreover, online matching problems have lots of applications in…
While every instance of the Hospitals/Residents problem admits a stable matching, the problem with lower quotas (HR-LQ) has instances with no stable matching. For such an instance, we expect the existence of an envy-free matching, which is…
The classical Stable Roommates problem is to decide whether there exists a matching of an even number of agents such that no two agents which are not matched to each other would prefer to be with each other rather than with their…
In a stable matching setting, we consider a query model that allows for an interactive learning algorithm to make precisely one type of query: proposing a matching, the response to which is either that the proposed matching is stable, or a…
We study one-sided matching problems where $n$ agents have preferences over $m$ objects and each of them need to be assigned to at most one object. Most work on such problems assume that the agents only have ordinal preferences and usually…
Chance constraints are frequently used to limit the probability of constraint violations in real-world optimization problems where the constraints involve stochastic components. We study chance-constrained submodular optimization problems,…
The classic two-sided many-to-one job matching model assumes that firms treat workers as substitutes and workers ignore colleagues when choosing where to work. Relaxing these assumptions may lead to nonexistence of stable matchings.…
We investigate the allocation of children to childcare facilities and propose solutions to overcome limitations in the current allocation mechanism. We introduce a natural preference domain and a priority structure that address these…
Typestate systems ensure many desirable properties of imperative programs, including initialization of object fields and correct use of stateful library interfaces. Abstract sets with cardinality constraints naturally generalize typestate…
Stable marriage of a two-sided market with unit demand is a classic problem that arises in many real-world scenarios. In addition, a unique stable marriage in this market simplifies a host of downstream desiderata. In this paper, we explore…