Related papers: Adapting Stable Matchings to Evolving Preferences
In many matching markets--such as athlete recruitment or academic admissions--participants on one side are evaluated by attribute vectors known to the other side, which in turn applies individual \emph{salience vectors} to assign relative…
In computing, as in many aspects of life, changes incur cost. Many optimization problems are formulated as a one-time instance starting from scratch. However, a common case that arises is when we already have a set of prior assignments, and…
Many important stable matching problems are known to be NP-hard, even when strong restrictions are placed on the input. In this paper we seek to identify structural properties of instances of stable matching problems which will allow us to…
We study deviations by a group of agents in the three main types of matching markets: the house allocation, the marriage, and the roommates models. For a given instance, we call a matching $k$-stable if no other matching exists that is more…
In bipartite matching problems, agents on two sides of a graph want to be paired according to their preferences. The stability of a matching depends on these preferences, which in uncertain environments also reflect agents' beliefs about…
In a stable matching setting, we consider a query model that allows for an interactive learning algorithm to make precisely one type of query: proposing a matching, the response to which is either that the proposed matching is stable, or a…
We consider the two-sided stable matching setting in which there may be uncertainty about the agents' preferences due to limited information or communication. We consider three models of uncertainty: (1) lottery model --- in which for each…
Research regarding the stable marriage and roommate problem has a long and distinguished history in mathematics, computer science and economics. Stability in this context is predominantly core stability or one of its variants in which each…
In a stable matching problem there are two groups of agents, with agents on one side having their individual preferences for agents on another side as a potential match. It is assumed silently that agents can freely and costlessly ``switch"…
We propose a generalization of the classical stable marriage problem. In our model, the preferences on one side of the partition are given in terms of arbitrary binary relations, which need not be transitive nor acyclic. This generalization…
In this paper, we begin by discussing different types of preference profiles related to the stable marriage problem. We then introduce the concept of soulmates, which are a man and a woman who rank each other first. Inversely, we examine…
In this paper, we study the fundamental problem of finding a stable matching in two-sided matching markets. In the classic variant, it is assumed that both sides of the market submit a ranked list of all agents on the other side. However,…
The stable roommates problem can admit multiple different stable matchings. We have different criteria for deciding which one is optimal, but computing those is often NP-hard. We show that the problem of finding generous or rank-maximal…
Many-to-many matching with contracts is studied in the framework of revealed preferences. All preferences are described by choice functions that satisfy natural conditions. Under a no-externality assumption individual preferences can be…
This paper studies matching markets where institutions are matched with possibly more than one individual. The matching market contains some couples who view the pair of jobs as complements. First, we show by means of an example that a…
The Balanced Stable Marriage problem is a central optimization version of the classic Stable Marriage problem. Here, the output cannot be an arbitrary stable matching, but one that balances between the dissatisfaction of the two parties,…
We study (coalitional) exchange stability, which Alcalde [Economic Design, 1995] introduced as an alternative solution concept for matching markets involving property rights, such as assigning persons to two-bed rooms. Here, a matching of a…
We study many-to-one matching problems between institutions and individuals, where each institution may be matched to multiple individuals. The matching market includes couples, who view pairs of institutions as complementary. Institutions'…
We study the classical, two-sided stable marriage problem under pairwise preferences. In the most general setting, agents are allowed to express their preferences as comparisons of any two of their edges and they also have the right to…
Stable matching is a fundamental problem studied both in economics and computer science. The task is to find a matching between two sides of agents that have preferences over who they want to be matched with. A matching is stable if no pair…