Related papers: No-boarding buses: Agents allowed to cooperate or …
The stochastic nature of public transport systems leads to headway variability and bus bunching, causing both operator and passenger cost to increase significantly. Traditional strategies to counter bus bunching, including bus-holding,…
The problem of free-riding arises when individuals benefit from a shared resource, service, or public good without contributing proportionately to its provision. This conduct often leads to a collective action problem, as individuals pursue…
We study a networked version of the minority game in which agents can choose to follow the choices made by a neighbouring agent in a social network. We show that for a wide variety of networks a leadership structure always emerges, with…
We investigate different versions of the minority game, a toy model for agents buying and selling a commodity. The Hamming distance between the strategies used by agents to take decisions is introduced as an analytical tool to determine…
This paper explores the Coevolutionary Optional Prisoner's Dilemma (COPD) game, which is a simple model to coevolve game strategy and link weights of agents playing the Optional Prisoner's Dilemma game. We consider a population of agents…
We analyze a simple model of adaptive competition which captures essential features of a variety of adaptive competitive systems in the social and biological sciences. Each of N agents, at each time step of a game, joins one of two groups.…
We consider a general polling model with $N$ stations. The stations are served exhaustively and in cyclic order. Once a station queue falls empty, the server does not immediately switch to the next station. Rather, it waits at the station…
Although influence maximization problem has been extensively studied over the past ten years, majority of existing work adopt one of the following models: \emph{full-feedback model} or \emph{zero-feedback model}. In the zero-feedback model,…
Airlines use different boarding policies to organize the queue of passengers waiting to enter the airplane. We analyze three policies in the many-passenger limit by a geometric representation of the queue position and row designation of…
It is a challenging task to reach global cooperation among self-interested agents, which often requires sophisticated design or usage of incentives. For example, we may apply supervisors or referees who are able to detect and punish…
We study the behaviour of a Schelling-class system in which a fraction $f$ of spatially-fixed switching agents is introduced. This new model allows for multiple interpretations, including: (i) random, non-preferential allocation…
Ride-pooling remains a promising emerging mode with a potential to contribute towards urban sustainability and emission reductions. Recent studies revealed complexity and diversity among travellers' ride-pooling aptitudes. So far,…
Cooperation in repeated public goods game is hardly achieved, unless contingent behavior is present. Surely, if mechanisms promoting positive assortment between cooperators are present, then cooperators may beat defectors, because…
Commitment is a well-established mechanism for fostering cooperation in human society and multi-agent systems. However, existing research has predominantly focused on the commitment that neglects the freedom of players to abstain from an…
The field of Game Theory provides a useful mechanism for modeling many decision-making scenarios. In participating in these scenarios individuals and groups adopt particular strategies, which generally perform with varying levels of…
Committee decisions are complicated by a deadline, e.g., the next start of a budget, or the beginning of a semester. In committee hiring decisions, it may be that if no candidate is supported by a strong majority, the default is to hire no…
We study a version of the minority game in which one agent is allowed to join the game in a random fashion. It is shown that in the crowded regime, i.e., for small values of the memory size $m$ of the agents in the population, the agent…
We put forward a new model of congestion games where agents have uncertainty over the routes used by other agents. We take a non-probabilistic approach, assuming that each agent knows that the number of agents using an edge is within a…
Motivated by the scarcity of accurate payoff feedback in practical applications of game theory, we examine a class of learning dynamics where players adjust their choices based on past payoff observations that are subject to noise and…
Problem definition: In many matching markets, some agents are fully flexible, while others only accept a subset of jobs. For example, ridesharing drivers can specify on the platform the destinations they are willing to accept. Conventional…