Related papers: Quantitative Mitigation of Timing Side Channels
Detection and quantification of information leaks through timing side channels are important to guarantee confidentiality. Although static analysis remains the prevalent approach for detecting timing side channels, it is computationally…
This thesis is concerned with the quantitative assessment of security in software. More specifically, it tackles the problem of efficient computation of channel capacity, the maximum amount of confidential information leaked by software,…
Cryptographic research takes software timing side channels seriously. Approaches to mitigate them include constant-time coding and techniques to enforce such practices. However, recent attacks like Meltdown [42], Spectre [37], and…
Physical side-channel attacks can compromise the security of integrated circuits. Most physical side-channel attacks (e.g., power or electromagnetic) exploit the dynamic behavior of a chip, typically manifesting as changes in current…
Timing and cache side channels provide powerful attacks against many sensitive operations including cryptographic implementations. Existing defenses cannot protect against all classes of such attacks without incurring prohibitive…
Power side-channel attacks, which can deduce secret data via statistical analysis, have become a serious threat. Masking is an effective countermeasure for reducing the statistical dependence between secret data and side-channel…
Machine learning (ML) models are known to be vulnerable to a number of attacks that target the integrity of their predictions or the privacy of their training data. To carry out these attacks, a black-box adversary must typically possess…
With the recent advancements in machine learning theory, many commercial embedded micro-processors use neural network models for a variety of signal processing applications. However, their associated side-channel security vulnerabilities…
Side channels represent a broad class of security vulnerabilities that have been demonstrated to exist in many applications. Because completely eliminating side channels often leads to prohibitively high overhead, there is a need for a…
Side-channel attacks impose a serious threat to cryptographic algorithms, including widely employed ones, such as AES and RSA. These attacks take advantage of the algorithm implementation in hardware or software to extract secret…
We introduce a novel generalization of entropy and conditional entropy from which most definitions from the literature can be derived as particular cases. Within this general framework, we investigate the problem of designing…
Timing side-channels represent an insidious security challenge for cloud computing, because: (a) massive parallelism in the cloud makes timing channels pervasive and hard to control; (b) timing channels enable one customer to steal…
The code generation modules inside modern compilers such as GCC and LLVM, which use a limited number of CPU registers to store a large number of program variables, may introduce side-channel leaks even in software equipped with…
Timing side-channels are an important threat to cryptography that still needs to be addressed in implementations, and the advent of post-quantum cryptography raises this issue because the lattice-based schemes may produce secret-dependent…
Side channel attacks have emerged as a serious threat to the security of both networked and embedded systems -- in particular through the implementations of cryptographic operations. Side channels can be difficult to model formally, but…
Rigorous quantitative evaluation of microarchitectural side channels is challenging for two reasons. First, the processors, attacks, and defenses often exhibit probabilistic behaviors. These probabilistic behaviors arise due to natural…
One of the primary challenges in large-scale distributed learning stems from stringent communication constraints. While several recent works address this challenge for static optimization problems, sequential decision-making under…
Power-based side-channel is a serious security threat to the System on Chip (SoC). The secret information is leaked from the power profile of the system while a cryptographic algorithm is running. The mitigation requires efforts from both…
We develop a new notion of security against timing attacks where the attacker is able to simultaneously observe the execution time of a program and the probability of the values of low variables. We then show how to measure the security of…
The PQDSS standardization process requires cryptographic primitives to be free from vulnerabilities, including timing and cache side-channels. Resistance to timing leakage is therefore an essential property, and achieving this typically…