Related papers: Nonatomic Aggregative Games with Infinitely Many T…
We prove that every two-player nonzero-sum stopping game in discrete time admits an \epsilon-equilibrium in randomized strategies for every \epsilon >0. We use a stochastic variation of Ramsey's theorem, which enables us to reduce the…
We study infinite asymptotic games in Banach spaces with an F.D.D. and prove that analytic games are determined by characterising precisely the conditions for the players to have winning strategies. These results are applied to characterise…
We exhibit the rich structure of the set of correlated equilibria by analyzing the simplest of polynomial games: the mixed extension of matching pennies. We show that while the correlated equilibrium set is convex and compact, the structure…
A central question in routing games has been to establish conditions for the uniqueness of the equilibrium, either in terms of network topology or in terms of costs. This question is well understood in two classes of routing games. The…
We show that in any $n$-player $m$-action normal-form game, we can obtain an approximate equilibrium by sampling any mixed-action equilibrium a small number of times. We study three types of equilibria: Nash, correlated and coarse…
We propose a type of non-cooperative game, termed multi-cluster aggregative game, which is composed of clusters as players, where each cluster consists of collaborative agents with cost functions depending on their own decisions and the…
We introduce a framework for stochastic games on large sparse graphs, covering continuous-time and discrete-time dynamic games as well as static games. Players are indexed by the vertices of simple, locally finite graphs, allowing both…
In a network game, players interact over a network and the utility of each player depends on his own action and on an aggregate of his neighbours' actions. Many real world networks of interest are asymmetric and involve a large number of…
Strategic games admit a multi-graph representation, in which two kinds of relations, accessibility, and preferences, are used to describe how the players compare the possible outcomes. A category of games with a fixed set of players…
We consider a game for a continuum of non-identical players evolving on a finite state space. Their heterogeneous interactions are represented by a graphon, which can be viewed as the limit of a dense random graph. The player's transition…
Equilibrium solution concepts of normal-form games, such as Nash equilibria, correlated equilibria, and coarse correlated equilibria, describe the joint strategy profiles from which no player has incentive to unilaterally deviate. They are…
We present a new approach to solving games with a countably or uncountably infinite number of players. Such games are often used to model multiagent systems with a large number of agents. The latter are frequently encountered in economics,…
For dynamic situations where the evolution of a player's state is influenced by his own action as well as other players' states and actions, we show that equilibria derived for nonatomic games (NGs) can be used by their large finite…
Finding equilibrium points in continuous minmax games has become a key problem within machine learning, in part due to its connection to the training of generative adversarial networks and reinforcement learning. Because of existence and…
Strategic interactions can be represented more concisely, and analyzed and solved more efficiently, if we are aware of the symmetries within the multiagent system. Symmetries also have conceptual implications, for example for equilibrium…
We consider a general nonzero-sum impulse game with two players. The main mathematical contribution of the paper is a verification theorem which provides, under some regularity conditions, a suitable system of quasi-variational inequalities…
A novel modelling framework is proposed for the analysis of aggregative games on an infinite-time horizon, assuming that players are subject to heterogeneous periodic constraints. A new aggregative equilibrium notion is presented and the…
Game theory is playing more and more important roles in understanding complex systems and in investigating intelligent machines with various uncertainties. As a starting point, we consider the classical two-player zero-sum linear-quadratic…
We study the asymptotic organization among many optimizing individuals interacting in a suitable "moderate" way. We justify this limiting game by proving that its solution provides approximate Nash equilibria for large but finite player…
We prove that every repeated game with countably many players, finite action sets, and tail-measurable payoffs admits an $\epsilon$-equilibrium, for every $\epsilon > 0$.