Related papers: Nonatomic Aggregative Games with Infinitely Many T…
We propose a finite automaton-style solution concept for supergames. In our model, we define an equilibrium to be a cycle of state switches and a supergame to be an infinite walk on states of a finite stage game. We show that if the stage…
The designs of many large-scale systems today, from traffic routing environments to smart grids, rely on game-theoretic equilibrium concepts. However, as the size of an $N$-player game typically grows exponentially with $N$, standard game…
We introduce and study a class of infinite-horizon non-zero-sum non-cooperative stochastic games with infinitely many interacting agents using ideas of statistical mechanics. First we show, in the general case of asymmetric interactions,…
Although mixed extensions of finite games always admit equilibria, this is not the case for countable games, the best-known example being Wald's pick-the-larger-integer game. Several authors have provided conditions for the existence of…
We consider $N$-player games, in continuous time, finite state space and finite time horizon, on a geometrical structure possessing a macroscopic limit in a suitable sense. This geometrical structure breaks the permutation invariance…
In this paper, we present a unifying framework for analyzing equilibria and designing interventions for large network games sampled from a stochastic network formation process represented by a graphon. We first introduce a new class of…
This paper studies the equilibrium properties of the ``obvious strategy profile'' in large finite-player games. Each player in such a strategy profile simply adopts a randomized strategy as she would have used in a symmetric equilibrium of…
We establish the existence and uniqueness of distributed equilibria to possibly nonsymmetric $N$ player differential games with interactions through controls under displacement semimonotonicity assumptions. Surprisingly, the nonseparable…
Evolutionary game theory is a powerful framework for studying evolution in populations of interacting individuals. A common assumption in evolutionary game theory is that interactions are symmetric, which means that the players are…
We study adaptive learning in a typical p-player game. The payoffs of the games are randomly generated and then held fixed. The strategies of the players evolve through time as the players learn. The trajectories in the strategy space…
In this paper, we study nonzero-sum separable games, which are continuous games whose payoffs take a sum-of-products form. Included in this subclass are all finite games and polynomial games. We investigate the structure of equilibria in…
We study multi-player games with perfect information and general payoff function, where the set of stages is the set of non-positive integers $\{\ldots,-2,-1,0\}$. We define two related equilibrium concepts: one considering only deviations…
We identify structural assumptions which provide solvability of the Nash system arising from a linear-quadratic closed-loop game, with stable properties with respect to the number of players. In a setting of interactions governed by a…
In this paper, we study finite-agent linear-quadratic games on graphs. Specifically, we propose a comprehensive framework that extends the existing literature by incorporating heterogeneous and interpretable player interactions. Compared to…
We provide a unified variational inequality framework for the study of fundamental properties of the Nash equilibrium in network games. We identify several conditions on the underlying network (in terms of spectral norm, infinity norm and…
Infinite games where several players seek to coordinate under imperfect information are deemed to be undecidable, unless the information is hierarchically ordered among the players. We identify a class of games for which joint winning…
We consider a class of Wasserstein distributionally robust Nash equilibrium problems, where agents construct heterogeneous data-driven Wasserstein ambiguity sets using private samples and radii, in line with their individual risk-averse…
We consider $\epsilon$-equilibria notions for constant value of $\epsilon$ in $n$-player $m$-actions games where $m$ is a constant. We focus on the following question: What is the largest grid size over the mixed strategies such that…
The theory of mean field games is a tool to understand noncooperative dynamic stochastic games with a large number of players. Much of the theory has evolved under conditions ensuring uniqueness of the mean field game Nash equilibrium.…
This work considers stochastic differential games with a large number of players, whose costs and dynamics interact through the empirical distribution of both their states and their controls. We develop a new framework to prove convergence…