Related papers: Coalitions in Repeated Games
The positive impact of cooperative bots on cooperation within evolutionary game theory is well documented; however, existing studies have predominantly used discrete strategic frameworks, focusing on deterministic actions with a fixed…
Using past behaviors to guide future actions is essential for fostering cooperation in repeated social dilemmas. Traditional memory-based strategies that focus on recent interactions have yielded valuable insights into the evolution of…
An independent set game is a cooperative game defined on graphs and dealing with profit-sharing in maximum independent set problems. A population monotonic allocation scheme is a rule specifying how to share the profit of each coalition…
We study coalition structure formation with intra and inter-coalition externalities in the introduced family of nested non-cooperative simultaneous finite games. A non-cooperative game embeds a coalition structure formation mechanism, and…
The theory of repeated games analyzes the long-term relationship of interacting players and mathematically reveals the condition of how cooperation is achieved, which is not achieved in a one-shot game. In the repeated prisoner's dilemma…
In this paper, we present a framework for the analysis of self-organized distributed coalition formation process for spectrum sharing in interference channel for large-scale ad hoc networks. In this approach, we use the concept of coalition…
We study the evolutionary robustness of strategies in infinitely repeated prisoners' dilemma games in which players make mistakes with a small probability and are patient. The evolutionary process we consider is given by the replicator…
We revisit games in partition function form, i.e. cooperative games where the payoff of a coalition depends on the partition of the entire set of players. We assume that each coalition computes its worth having probabilistic beliefs over…
In this paper a coalitional control and observation scheme is presented in which the coalitions are changed online by enabling and disabling communication links. Transitions between coalitions are made to best balance overall system…
The iterated prisoner's dilemma is a game that produces many counter-intuitive and complex behaviors in a social environment, based on very simple basic rules. It illustrates that cooperation can be a good thing even in a competitive world,…
The paper defines a non-cooperative simultaneous finite game to study coalition structure formation with intra and inter-coalition externalities. The novelty of the game is that the game definition embeds a \textit{coalition structure…
Solutions to the coalition formation problem commonly assume agent rationality and, correspondingly, utility maximization. This in turn may prevent agents from making compromises. As shown in recent studies, compromise may facilitate…
We revisit the coalition structure generation problem in which the goal is to partition the players into exhaustive and disjoint coalitions so as to maximize the social welfare. One of our key results is a general polynomial-time algorithm…
Cooperative interval game is a cooperative game in which every coalition gets assigned some closed real interval. This models uncertainty about how much the members of a coalition get for cooperating together. In this paper we study…
Complex social behaviors lie at the heart of many of the challenges facing evolutionary biology, sociology, economics, and beyond. For evolutionary biologists in particular the question is often how such behaviors can arise \textit{de novo}…
This paper studies repeated games where two players play multiple duopolistic games simultaneously (multimarket contact). A key assumption is that each player receives a noisy and private signal about the other's actions (private monitoring…
Teamwork is vital in many settings, and it is socially beneficial for teams to cooperate in some situations (``good games'') and not in others (``bad games;'' e.g., those that allow for corruption). A team's cooperation in any given game…
We study a distributed allocation process where, repeatedly in time, every player renegotiates past allocations with neighbors and allocates new revenues. The average allocations evolve according to a doubly (over time and space) averaging…
This study employs gamified experiments to investigate and refine the Schelling Model of Segregation, a framework that demonstrates how individual preferences can lead to systemic segregation. Using a movement selection algorithm derived…
In this note, we prove the existence of an equilibrium concept, dubbed conditional strategy equilibrium, for non-cooperative games in which a strategy of a player is a function from the other players' actions to her own actions. We study…