Related papers: Average-case Analysis of the Assignment Problem wi…
We study the problem of assigning objects to agents in the presence of arbitrary linear constraints when agents are allowed to be indifferent between objects. Our main contribution is the generalization of the (Extended) Probabilistic…
We study the envy-free house allocation problem when agents have uncertain preferences over items and consider several well-studied preference uncertainty models. The central problem that we focus on is computing an allocation that has the…
We introduce a constrained priority mechanism that combines outcome-based matching from machine-learning with preference-based allocation schemes common in market design. Using real-world data, we illustrate how our mechanism could be…
In several social choice problems, agents collectively make decisions over the allocation of multiple divisible and heterogeneous resources with capacity constraints to maximize utilitarian social welfare. The agents are constrained through…
Mean estimation under differential privacy is a fundamental problem, but worst-case optimal mechanisms do not offer meaningful utility guarantees in practice when the global sensitivity is very large. Instead, various heuristics have been…
We study the problem of fairly allocating $m$ indivisible items among $n$ agents. Envy-free allocations, in which each agent prefers her bundle to the bundle of every other agent, need not exist in the worst case. However, when agents have…
We analyze a stochastic approximation algorithm for decision-dependent problems, wherein the data distribution used by the algorithm evolves along the iterate sequence. The primary examples of such problems appear in performative prediction…
We consider the problem of fairly allocating a set of indivisible goods among agents with additive valuations. Ex-ante fairness (proportionality) can trivially be obtained by giving all goods to a random agent. Yet, such an allocation is…
We study the Price of Anarchy of mechanisms for the well-known problem of one-sided matching, or house allocation, with respect to the social welfare objective. We consider both ordinal mechanisms, where agents submit preference lists over…
We consider the problem of hypothesis testing for discrete distributions. In the standard model, where we have sample access to an underlying distribution $p$, extensive research has established optimal bounds for uniformity testing,…
Consider the problem of assigning indivisible objects to agents with strict ordinal preferences over objects, where each agent is interested in consuming at most one object, and objects have integer minimum and maximum quotas. We define an…
Fairly dividing a set of indivisible resources to a set of agents is of utmost importance in some applications. However, after an allocation has been implemented the preferences of agents might change and envy might arise. We study the…
The seminar assignment problem is a variant of the generalized assignment problem in which items have unit size and the amount of space allowed in each bin is restricted to an arbitrary set of values. The problem has been shown to be…
The maximin share (MMS) guarantee is a desirable fairness notion for allocating indivisible goods. While MMS allocations do not always exist, several approximation techniques have been developed to ensure that all agents receive a fraction…
We study the optimal sample complexity of variable selection in linear regression under general design covariance, and show that subset selection is optimal while under standard complexity assumptions, efficient algorithms for this problem…
We consider the problem of approximate maximin share (MMS) allocation of indivisible items among three agents with additive valuation functions. For goods, we show that an $\frac{11}{12}$ - MMS allocation always exists, improving over the…
This paper focuses on the problem of finding a particular data recommendation strategy based on the user preferences and a system expected revenue. To this end, we formulate this problem as an optimization by designing the recommendation…
I study the optimal design of ratings to motivate agent investment in quality when transfers are unavailable. The principal designs a rating scheme that maps the agent's quality to a (possibly stochastic) score. The agent has private…
We study the problem of selection in the context of Bayesian persuasion. We are given multiple agents with hidden values (or quality scores), to whom resources must be allocated by a welfare-maximizing decision-maker. An intermediary with…
The value maximization version of the secretary problem is the problem of hiring a candidate with the largest value from a randomly ordered sequence of candidates. In this work, we consider a setting where predictions of candidate values…