Related papers: Two-sided profile-based optimality in the stable m…
Given a set of $m$ agents and a set of $n$ items, where agent $A$ has utility $u_{A,i}$ for item $i$, our goal is to allocate items to agents to maximize fairness. Specifically, the utility of an agent is the sum of its utilities for items…
We consider the matching problem in the metric distortion framework. There are $n$ agents and $n$ items occupying points in a shared metric space, and the goal is to design a matching mechanism that outputs a low-cost matching between the…
In this article, we study the efficient dynamical computation of all-pairs SimRanks on time-varying graphs. Li {\em et al}.'s approach requires $O(r^4 n^2)$ time and $O(r^2 n^2)$ memory in a graph with $n$ nodes, where $r$ is the target…
In this paper we further investigate the well-studied problem of finding a perfect matching in a regular bipartite graph. The first non-trivial algorithm, with running time $O(mn)$, dates back to K\"{o}nig's work in 1916 (here $m=nd$ is the…
In this paper, we begin by discussing different types of preference profiles related to the stable marriage problem. We then introduce the concept of soulmates, which are a man and a woman who rank each other first. Inversely, we examine…
We focus on the one-to-one two-sided matching model with two disjoint sets of agents of equal size, where each agent in a set has preferences on the agents in the other set modeled by a linear order. A matching mechanism associates a set of…
In this paper, we demonstrate that in many NP-complete variants of the stable matching problem, such as the Stable Hypergraph Matching problem, the Stable Multicommodity Flow problem, and the College Admission problem with common quotas, a…
This paper investigates to what extent one can improve reinforcement learning algorithms. Our study is split in three parts. First, our analysis shows that the classical asymptotic convergence rate $O(1/\sqrt{N})$ is pessimistic and can be…
Robust optimization (RO) is a powerful paradigm for decision making under uncertainty. Existing algorithms for solving RO, including the reformulation approach and the cutting-plane method, do not scale well, hindering the application of RO…
The many-to-one stable matching problem provides the fundamental abstraction of several real-world matching markets such as school choice and hospital-resident allocation. The agents on both sides are often referred to as residents and…
We study the fully dynamic maximum matching problem. In this problem, the goal is to efficiently maintain an approximate maximum matching of a graph that is subject to edge insertions and deletions. Our focus is on algorithms that maintain…
Mergesort is one of the few efficient sorting algorithms and, despite being the oldest one, often still the method of choice today. In contrast to some alternative algorithms, it always runs efficiently using O(n log n) element comparisons…
We introduce a new algorithm for finding stable matchings in multi-sided matching markets. Our setting is motivated by a PhD market of students, advisors, and co-advisors, and can be generalized to supply chain networks viewed as $n$-sided…
We present a number of positive and negative results for variants of the matroid secretary problem. Most notably, we design a constant-factor competitive algorithm for the "random assignment" model where the weights are assigned randomly to…
We introduce a `concrete complexity' model for studying algorithms for matching in bipartite graphs. The model is based on the "demand query" model used for combinatorial auctions. Most (but not all) known algorithms for bipartite matching…
We study population protocols, a model of distributed computing appropriate for modeling well-mixed chemical reaction networks and other physical systems where agents exchange information in pairwise interactions, but have no control over…
We study the problem of computing maximin share guarantees, a recently introduced fairness notion. Given a set of $n$ agents and a set of goods, the maximin share of a single agent is the best that she can guarantee to herself, if she would…
We study the design of one-to-one matching mechanisms that are strategy-proof for both sides and as stable as possible. Motivated by the impossibility result of Roth (1982), we formulate the mechanism design problem as a linear program that…
Consider the group of $n$ men and $n$ women, each with their own preference list for a potential marriage partner. The stable marriage is a bipartite matching such that no unmatched pair (man, woman) prefer each other to their partners in…
In the ordinal Matroid Secretary Problem (MSP), elements from a weighted matroid are presented in random order to an algorithm that must incrementally select a large weight independent set. However, the algorithm can only compare pairs of…