Related papers: A tutorial on Zero-sum Stochastic Games

This paper provides necessary and sufficient conditions for a pair of randomised stopping times to form a saddle point of a zero-sum Dynkin game with partial and/or asymmetric information across players. The framework is non-Markovian and…

We present two zero-sum games modeling situations where one player attacks (or hides in) a finite dimensional nonempty compact set, and the other tries to prevent the attack (or find him). The first game, called patrolling game, corresponds…

We study a two-player nonzero-sum stochastic differential game where one player controls the state variable via additive impulses while the other player can stop the game at any time. The main goal of this work is characterize Nash…

We discuss and compare two methods of investigations for the asymptotic regime of stochastic differential games with a finite number of players as the number of players tends to the infinity. These two methods differ in the order in which…

This paper investigates the discrete-time asynchronous games in which noncooperative agents seek to minimize their individual cost functions. Building on the assumption of partial asynchronism, i.e., each agent updates at least once within…

In this paper, we study nonzero-sum separable games, which are continuous games whose payoffs take a sum-of-products form. Included in this subclass are all finite games and polynomial games. We investigate the structure of equilibria in…

This paper considers a class of reinforcement-based learning (namely, perturbed learning automata) and provides a stochastic-stability analysis in repeatedly-played, positive-utility, finite strategic-form games. Prior work in this class of…

Graph games provide the foundation for modeling and synthesizing reactive processes. In the synthesis of stochastic reactive processes, the traditional model is perfect-information stochastic games, where some transitions of the game graph…

This paper examines finite zero-sum stochastic games and demonstrates that when the game's duration is sufficiently long, there exists a pair of approximately optimal strategies such that the expected average payoff at any point in the game…

The paper deals with a zero-sum differential game in which the dynamical system is described by a fractional differential equation with the Caputo derivative of an order $\alpha \in (0, 1).$ The goal of the first (second) player is to…

We study a class of stochastic target games where one player tries to find a strategy such that the state process almost-surely reaches a given target, no matter which action is chosen by the opponent. Our main result is a geometric dynamic…

This paper aims to solve two fundamental problems on finite or infinite horizon dynamic games with perfect or almost perfect information. Under some mild conditions, we prove (1) the existence of subgame-perfect equilibria in general…

This paper studies the finite-time horizon Markov games where the agents' dynamics are decoupled but the rewards can possibly be coupled across agents. The policy class is restricted to local policies where agents make decisions using their…

Stochastic games are a classical model in game theory in which two opponents interact and the environment changes in response to the players' behavior. The central solution concepts for these games are the discounted values and the value,…

We introduce two-level discounted games played by two players on a perfect-information stochastic game graph. The upper level game is a discounted game and the lower level game is an undiscounted reachability game. Two-level games model…

This article is related to risk-sensitive nonzero-sum stochastic differential games in the Markovian framework. This game takes into account the attitudes of the players toward risk and the utility is of exponential form. We show the…

We provide a direct, elementary proof for the existence of $\lim_{\lambda\to 0} v_{\lambda}$, where $v_{\lambda}$ is the value of a $\lambda$-discounted finite two-person zero-sum stochastic game.

We consider 2-player stochastic games with perfectly observed actions, and study the limit, as the discount factor goes to one, of the equilibrium payoffs set. In the usual setup where current states are observed by the players, we show…

This paper provides sufficient conditions for the existence of solutions for two-person zero-sum games with inf/sup-compact payoff functions and with possibly noncompact decision sets for both players. Payoff functions may be unbounded, and…

We consider two-player zero-sum games on graphs. These games can be classified on the basis of the information of the players and on the mode of interaction between them. On the basis of information the classification is as follows: (a)…