Related papers: Price Setting on a Network
In this paper we introduce a capacity allocation game which models the problem of maximizing network utility from the perspective of distributed noncooperative agents. Motivated by the idea of self-managed networks, in the developed…
An existing challenge in power systems is the implementation of optimal demand management through dynamic pricing. This paper encompasses the design, analysis and implementation of a novel on-line pricing scheme based on coalitional game…
We model a delivery platform facilitating transactions among three sides: buyers, stores, and couriers. In addition to buyers paying store-specific purchase prices and couriers receiving store--buyer-specific delivery compensation from the…
Large-scale online recommendation systems must facilitate the allocation of a limited number of items among competing users while learning their preferences from user feedback. As a principled way of incorporating market constraints and…
We formulate an equilibrium model of intraday trading in electricity markets. Agents face balancing constraints between their customers consumption plus intraday sales and their production plus intraday purchases. They have continuously…
Personalized pricing assigns different prices to customers for the same product based on customer-specific features to improve retailer revenue. However, this practice often raises concerns about fairness at both the individual and group…
In revenue maximization of selling a digital product in a social network, the utility of an agent is often considered to have two parts: a private valuation, and linearly additive influences from other agents. We study the incomplete…
We model the role of an online platform disrupting a market with unit-demand buyers and unit-supply sellers. Each seller can transact with a subset of the buyers whom she already knows, as well as with any additional buyers to whom she is…
The Internet has emerged as perhaps the most important network in modern computing, but rather miraculously, it was created through the individual actions of a multitude of agents rather than by a central planning authority. This motivates…
During a pandemic people have to find a trade-off between meeting others and staying safely at home. While meeting others is pleasant, it also increases the risk of infection. We consider this dilemma by introducing a game-theoretic network…
This is the third paper in a series concerning the game-theoretic aspects of position-building while in competition. The first paper set forth foundations and laid out the essential goal, which is to minimize implementation costs in light…
A monopolist offers personalized prices to consumers with unit demand, heterogeneous values, and idiosyncratic costs, who differ in a protected characteristic, such as race or gender. The seller is subject to a non-discrimination…
This paper studies a class of network games with linear-quadratic payoffs and externalities exerted through a strictly concave interaction function. This class of game is motivated by the diminishing marginal effects with peer influences.…
We consider a model where agents differ in their `types' which determines their voluntary contribution towards a public good. We analyze what the equilibrium composition of groups are under centralized and centralized choice. We show that…
We consider the pricing problem faced by a seller who assigns a price to a good that confers its benefits not only to its buyers, but also to other individuals around them. For example, a snow-blower is potentially useful not only to the…
An active line of research has considered games played on networks in which payoffs depend on both a player's individual decision and also the decisions of her neighbors. Such games have been used to model issues including the formation of…
We consider a market where a finite number of players trade an asset whose supply is a stochastic process. The price formation problem consists of finding a price process that ensures that when agents act optimally to minimize their trading…
We study a game with \emph{strategic} vendors who own multiple items and a single buyer with a submodular valuation function. The goal of the vendors is to maximize their revenue via pricing of the items, given that the buyer will buy the…
We develop a model where firms determine the price at which they sell their differentiable goods, the volume that they produce, and the inputs (types and amounts) that they purchase from other firms. A steady-state production network…
We consider a monopolistic seller in a market that may be segmented. The surplus of each consumer in a segment depends on the price that the seller optimally charges, which depends on the set of consumers in the segment. We study which…