Related papers: Stability-Preserving, Time-Efficient Mechanisms fo…

Decomposing knowledge into interchangeable pieces promises a generalization advantage when there are changes in distribution. A learning agent interacting with its environment is likely to be faced with situations requiring novel…

In this paper, we investigate stable matching in structured networks. Consider case of matching in social networks where candidates are not fully connected. A candidate on one side of the market gets acquaintance with which one on the…

The setting of an agent making decisions under uncertainty and under dynamic constraints is common for the fields of optimal control, reinforcement learning, and recently also for online learning. In the online learning setting, the quality…

We study the problem of learning Markov decision processes with finite state and action spaces when the transition probability distributions and loss functions are chosen adversarially and are allowed to change with time. We introduce an…

We study conditions for the existence of stable and group-strategy-proof mechanisms in a many-to-one matching model with contracts if students' preferences are monotone in contract terms. We show that "equivalence", properly defined, to a…

We consider a many-to-one variant of the stable matching problem. More concretely, we consider the variant of the stable matching problem where one side has a matroid constraint. Furthermore, we consider the situation where the preference…

Dynamic decisions are pivotal to economic policy making. We show how existing evidence from randomized control trials can be utilized to guide personalized decisions in challenging dynamic environments with budget and capacity constraints.…

We extend the seminal model of Pathak and S\"onmez (2008) to a setting with multiple school districts, each running its own separate centralized match, and focus on the case of two districts. In our setting, in addition to each student…

In a carsharing system, a fleet of cars is distributed at stations in an urban area, customers can take and return cars at any time and station. For operating such a system in a satisfactory way, the stations have to keep a good ratio…

Following up on purely theoretical work of Bredereck et al. [AAAI 2020], we contribute further theoretical insights into adapting stable two-sided matchings to change. Moreover, we perform extensive empirical studies hinting at numerous…

In the Stable Roommates problem, we seek a stable matching of the agents into pairs, in which no two agents have an incentive to deviate from their assignment. It is well known that a stable matching is unlikely to exist, but a stable…

We study the problem of online learning with dynamics, where a learner interacts with a stateful environment over multiple rounds. In each round of the interaction, the learner selects a policy to deploy and incurs a cost that depends on…

We consider the problem of state selection for a stochastic system, initially in an unstable stationary state, when multiple metastable states compete for occupation. Using path-integral techniques we derive remarkably simple and accurate…

Recently dozens of school districts and college admissions systems around the world have reformed their admission rules. As a main motivation for these reforms the policymakers cited strategic flaws of the rules: students had strong…

The school choice mechanism design problem focuses on assignment mechanisms matching students to public schools in a given school district. The well-known Gale Shapley Student Optimal Stable Matching Mechanism (SOSM) is the most efficient…

Bounding the price of anarchy, which quantifies the damage to social welfare due to selfish behavior of the participants, has been an important area of research. In this paper, we study this phenomenon in the context of a game modeling…

The stable roommates problem can admit multiple different stable matchings. We have different criteria for deciding which one is optimal, but computing those is often NP-hard. We show that the problem of finding generous or rank-maximal…

The stable marriage problem has a wide variety of practical applications, ranging from matching resident doctors to hospitals, to matching students to schools, or more generally to any two-sided market. We consider a useful variation of the…

We consider a two-road dynamic routing game where the state of one of the roads (the "risky road") is stochastic and may change over time. This generates room for experimentation. A central planner may wish to induce some of the (finite…

School congestion, where student enrollment exceeds school capacity, is a major challenge in low- and middle-income countries. It highly impacts learning outcomes and deepens inequities in education. While subsidy programs that transfer…