Related papers: The Large Space of Information Structures
In this paper, we present a conceptual model game to examine the dynamics of asymmetric interactions in games with imperfect information. The game involves two agents with starkly contrasting capabilities: one agent can take actions but has…
We consider two-player games played on weighted directed graphs with mean-payoff and total-payoff objectives, two classical quantitative objectives. While for single-dimensional games the complexity and memory bounds for both objectives…
In a game of incomplete information, an infinite state space can create problems. When the space is uncountably large, the strategy spaces of the players may be unwieldly, resulting in a lack of measurable equilibria. When the knowledge of…
Pursuit-Evasion Games (in discrete time) are stochastic games with nonnegative daily payoffs, with the final payoff being the cumulative sum of payoffs during the game. We show that such games admit a value even in the presence of…
We study the problem of finding equilibrium strategies in multi-agent games with incomplete payoff information, where the payoff matrices are only known to the players up to some bounded uncertainty sets. In such games, an ex-post…
Recent advancements in algorithms for sequential decision-making under imperfect information have shown remarkable success in large games such as limit- and no-limit poker. These algorithms traditionally formalize the games using the…
Probabilistic graphical models (PGMs) provide a compact and flexible framework to model very complex real-life phenomena. They combine the probability theory which deals with uncertainty and logical structure represented by a graph which…
We analyze a two-player, nonzero-sum Dynkin game of stopping with incomplete information. We assume that each player observes his own Brownian motion, which is not only independent of the other player's Brownian motion but also not…
Mertens [In Proceedings of the International Congress of Mathematicians (Berkeley, Calif., 1986) (1987) 1528-1577 Amer. Math. Soc.] proposed two general conjectures about repeated games: the first one is that, in any two-person zero-sum…
Optimization under uncertainty is a fundamental problem in learning and decision-making, particularly in multi-agent systems. Previously, Feldman, Kalai, and Tennenholtz [2010] demonstrated the ability to efficiently compete in repeated…
Recently, in [K.R. Apt and S. Simon: Well-founded extensive games with perfect information, TARK21], we studied well-founded games, a natural extension of finite extensive games with perfect information in which all plays are finite. We…
We propose an implementable, neural network-based structure preserving probabilistic numerical approximation for a generalized obstacle problem describing the value of a zero-sum differential game of optimal stopping with asymmetric…
We study multiplayer Blackwell games, which are repeated games where the payoff of each player is a bounded and Borel-measurable function of the infinite stream of actions played by the players during the game. These games are an extension…
We formulate and analyze a general class of stochastic dynamic games with asymmetric information arising in dynamic systems. In such games, multiple strategic agents control the system dynamics and have different information about the…
Choice overload occurs when individuals feel overwhelmed by an excessive number of options. Experimental evidence suggests that a larger selection can complicate the decision-making process. Consequently, choice satisfaction may diminish…
This paper aims to solve two fundamental problems on finite or infinite horizon dynamic games with perfect or almost perfect information. Under some mild conditions, we prove (1) the existence of subgame-perfect equilibria in general…
The notions of symmetry and anonymity in strategic games have been formalized in different ways in the literature. We propose a combinatorial framework to analyze these notions, using group actions. Then, the same framework is used to…
We consider a two-player dynamic information design problem between a principal and a receiver -- a game is played between the two agents on top of a Markovian system controlled by the receiver's actions, where the principal obtains and…
Through a stochastic control theoretic approach, we analyze reputation games where a strategic long-lived player acts in a sequential repeated game against a collection of short-lived players. The key assumption in our model is that the…
The variation of a martingale $p_0^k=p_0,...,p_k$ of probabilities on a finite (or countable) set $X$ is denoted $V(p_0^k)$ and defined by $V(p_0^k)=E(\sum_{t=1}^k|p_t-p_{t-1}|_1)$. It is shown that $V(p_0^k)\leq \sqrt{2kH(p_0)}$, where…