Related papers: An interim core for normal form games and exchange…
We consider an extension of strategic normal form games with a phase of negotiations before the actual play of the game, where players can make binding offers for transfer of utilities to other players after the play of the game, in order…
We consider an extension of strategic normal form games with a phase before the actual play of the game, where players can make binding offers for transfer of utilities to other players after the play of the game, contingent on the…
We study a class of two-player repeated games with incomplete information and informational externalities. In these games, two states are chosen at the outset, and players get private information on the pair, before engaging in repeated…
Concurrent multi-player mean-payoff games are important models for systems of agents with individual, non-dichotomous preferences. Whilst these games have been extensively studied in terms of their equilibria in non-cooperative settings,…
The computation of a solution concept of a cooperative game usually employs values of all coalitions. However, in some applications, the values of some of the coalitions might be unknown due to high costs associated with their determination…
The computation of a solution concept of a cooperative game usually depends on values of all coalitions. However, in some applications, values of some of the coalitions might be unknown due to various reasons. We introduce a method to…
Strategic interactions between competitive entities are generally considered from the perspective of complete revelation of benefits achieved from those interactions, in the form of public payoff functions and/or beliefs, in the announced…
In rational verification, the aim is to verify which temporal logic properties will obtain in a multi-agent system, under the assumption that agents ("players") in the system choose strategies for acting that form a game theoretic…
We provide general theoretical foundations for modeling strategic uncertainty in large distributional Bayesian games with general type spaces, using a version of interim correlated rationalizability. We then focus on the case in which…
The core is a dominant solution concept in economics and cooperative game theory; it is predominantly used for profit, equivalently cost or utility, sharing. This paper demonstrates the versatility of this notion by proposing a completely…
Cooperative interval game is a cooperative game in which every coalition gets assigned some closed real interval. This models uncertainty about how much the members of a coalition get for cooperating together. In this paper we study…
We examine sequential equilibrium in the context of computational games, where agents are charged for computation. In such games, an agent can rationally choose to forget, so issues of imperfect recall arise. In this setting, we consider…
This paper studies a nonzero-sum Dynkin game in discrete time under non-exponential discounting. For both players, there are two levels of game-theoretic reasoning intertwined. First, each player looks for an intra-personal equilibrium…
In this paper, we introduce a game theoretic framework for studying the problem of minimizing the delay of instantly decodable network coding (IDNC) for cooperative data exchange (CDE) in decentralized wireless network. In this…
We study bargaining games between suppliers and manufacturers in a network context. Agents wish to enter into contracts in order to generate surplus which then must be divided among the participants. Potential contracts and their surplus…
A competitive market is modeled as a game of incomplete information. One player observes some payoff-relevant state and can sell (possibly noisy) messages thereof to the other, whose willingness to pay is contingent on their own beliefs. We…
In strategic games such as the prisoner's dilemma, allowing players to make binding offers of utility transfers before play has been shown to alter incentives and potentially support cooperative outcomes. These preplay exchange mechanisms…
In the usual models of cooperative game theory, the outcome of a coalition formation process is either the grand coalition or a coalition structure that consists of disjoint coalitions. However, in many domains where coalitions are…
The holiday gift exchange game is a familiar social institution with nontrivial strategic structure. We provide a formal treatment of the game's mechanics, defining the state space, action sets, and the recursive structure of stealing…
In repeated games, cooperation is possible in equilibrium only if players are sufficiently patient, and long-term gains from cooperation outweigh short-term gains from deviation. What happens if the players have incomplete information…