Related papers: Reactive learning strategies for iterated games
In collaborative goal-oriented settings, the participants are not only interested in achieving a successful outcome, but do also implicitly negotiate the effort they put into the interaction (by adapting to each other). In this work, we…
Direct reciprocity is a mechanism for the evolution of cooperation in repeated social interactions. According to this literature, individuals naturally learn to adopt conditionally cooperative strategies if they have multiple encounters…
In many daily tasks we make multiple decisions before reaching a goal. In order to learn such sequences of decisions, a mechanism to link earlier actions to later reward is necessary. Reinforcement learning theory suggests two classes of…
The Internet has enabled the emergence of collective problem solving, also known as crowdsourcing, as a viable option for solving complex tasks. However, the openness of crowdsourcing presents a challenge because solutions obtained by it…
We argue for the use of active learning methods for player modelling. In active learning, the learning algorithm chooses where to sample the search space so as to optimise learning progress. We hypothesise that player modelling based on…
Fictitious play with reinforcement learning is a general and effective framework for zero-sum games. However, using the current deep neural network models, the implementation of fictitious play faces crucial challenges. Neural network model…
Consider a 2-player normal-form game repeated over time. We introduce an adaptive learning procedure, where the players only observe their own realized payoff at each stage. We assume that agents do not know their own payoff function, and…
Spatial evolutionary games provide a valuable framework for elucidating the emergence and maintenance of cooperative behavior. However, most previous studies assume that individuals are profiteers and neglect to consider the effects of…
Experience replay enables reinforcement learning agents to memorize and reuse past experiences, just as humans replay memories for the situation at hand. Contemporary off-policy algorithms either replay past experiences uniformly or utilize…
Strategies for sustaining cooperation and preventing exploitation by selfish agents in repeated games have mostly been restricted to Markovian strategies where the response of an agent depends on the actions in the previous round. Such…
In iterated games, a player can unilaterally exert influence over the outcome through a careful choice of strategy. A powerful class of such "payoff control" strategies was discovered by Press and Dyson (2012). Their so-called…
Online learning algorithms that minimize regret provide strong guarantees in situations that involve repeatedly making decisions in an uncertain environment, e.g. a driver deciding what route to drive to work every day. While regret…
We consider a number of questions related to tradeoffs between reward and regret in repeated gameplay between two agents. To facilitate this, we introduce a notion of $\textit{generalized equilibrium}$ which allows for asymmetric regret…
Cooperation is usually represented as a Prisoner's Dilemma game. Although individual self-interest may not favour cooperation, cooperation can evolve if, for example, players interact multiple times adjusting their behaviour accordingly to…
Reinforcement learning algorithms describe how an agent can learn an optimal action policy in a sequential decision process, through repeated experience. In a given environment, the agent policy provides him some running and terminal…
We add the assumption that players know their opponents' payoff functions and rationality to a model of non-equilibrium learning in signaling games. Agents are born into player roles and play against random opponents every period.…
We consider a computing system where a master processor assigns tasks for execution to worker processors through the Internet. We model the workers decision of whether to comply (compute the task) or not (return a bogus result to save the…
We examine the effects of memory and different updating paradigms in a game-theoretic model of competitive learning, where agents are influenced in their choice of strategy by both the choices made by, and the consequent success rates of,…
Repeated games are difficult to analyze, especially when agents play mixed strategies. We study one-memory strategies in iterated prisoner's dilemma, then generalize the result to k-memory strategies in repeated games. Our result shows that…
In adversarial environments, one side could gain an advantage by identifying the opponent's strategy. For example, in combat games, if an opponents strategy is identified as overly aggressive, one could lay a trap that exploits the…